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“In order to . . . [prevent future crises], standardized and identical 
collective action clauses (CACs) will be included . . . in the terms and 
conditions of  all new euro area government bonds . . . .” 
- Statement by the Eurogroup, November 28, 20101 
 
“CACs. Why’d it have to be CACs?”  
- Dr. Henry Walton “Indiana” Jones, Jr.2 
INTRODUCTION 
After a half-century, Depression-induced slumber, the market for 
sovereign bonds awakened in the early 1990s. It did so on the heels of  a 
financial crisis triggered by widespread sovereign defaults on commercial 
bank loans. Under a plan developed by U.S. Secretary of  the Treasury 
Nicholas Brady, these illiquid commercial loans were restructured and 
replaced by tradable bonds — a process that reinvigorated the bond 
markets but did not herald a new era of  economic security.3 Between 1995 
and 2002, three new crises erupted, and the official sector repeatedly 
extended unpopular bailouts to debtor nations.4 A consensus emerged that 
the international financial architecture was broken. The system required a 
mechanism to ensure that private lenders bore the cost of  their 
improvident loans, thus discouraging them from making such loans in the 
first place.5 Otherwise, the cycle of  over-borrowing, default, and bailouts 
would continue. 
For nearly a decade, policymakers and market actors debated solutions. 
A multilateral treaty establishing a bankruptcy court for sovereigns? A fine 
idea, some thought, but it was politically infeasible.6 And anyway, what if  
the problem could be addressed without such a drastic intervention? 
Some — in particular, officials at the U.S. Department of  the Treasury — 
thought that the problem could be fixed by changing the terms of  bond 
                                                          
1. Press Release, Council of the European Union, Statement by the Eurogroup 1–2 (Nov. 28, 
2010) [hereinafter Eurogroup Press Release], available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/118050.pdf.  
2. Our apologies to Harrison Ford. The actual quote (“Snakes. Why’d it have to be snakes?”) 
appears in the movie Raiders of  the Lost Ark. See RAIDERS OF THE LOST ARK (Paramount Pictures 
1981).  
3. For a discussion of the development of  this market in the early 1990s, see Ross P. Buckley, The 
Facilitation of  the Brady Plan: Emerging Markets Trading from 1989 to 1993, 21 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1802 
(1997). 
4. See, e.g., JOHN B. TAYLOR, GLOBAL FINANCIAL WARRIORS 100 (2007); Stephen J. Choi et al., 
The Dynamics of  Contract Evolution, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 17 (2013). 
5. See, e.g., Ross P. Buckley, Sovereign Bankruptcy, 15 BOND L. REV. 95 (2003) (advocating 
bankruptcy regime as mechanism for dealing with sovereign default).  
6. For a general discussion of the events leading up to the adoption of CACs in the New York 
law market, see Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, Public Symbol in Private Contract: A Case Study, 84 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 1627, 1649–60 (2006). 
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contracts.7 These advocates recognized that the crises of  the late 1990s 
and early 2000s involved countries that often issued bonds governed by 
New York law.8 These bonds were the poster children for contract reform. 
Unlike the orderly, collective workout envisioned by bankruptcy laws, New 
York-law sovereign bonds gave each holder the contractual right to opt out 
of  a restructuring.9 A bondholder might exploit this right, delaying a 
restructuring that would benefit the group as a whole by demanding a 
better deal for itself.10 To fix the problem, some observers claimed,11 
bonds should adopt new terms, called Collective Action Clauses (CACs), 
that allowed for collectively binding restructuring decisions. 
Reformers promoted two types of  CACs in particular.12 The first was a 
collective modification clause, which allows a defined percentage of  
bondholders to accept a restructuring proposal in a way that will bind the 
entire group.13 The second was a collective acceleration clause, which 
prevents individual bondholders from demanding full payment after a 
default and instead requires a minimum bondholder vote to approve such 
a demand.14 Both clauses limit the ability of  dissenting bondholders to 
threaten litigation or otherwise hold up a restructuring.15 To their 
proponents in the official sector, these features meant that CACs might 
                                                          
7. See id. 
8. See W. Mark C. Weidemaier & Mitu Gulati, How Markets Work: The Lawyer’s Version, STUD. L., 
POL., & SOC’Y (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 9), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1886435. 
9. See id. (manuscript at 22–23). 
10. See Barry Eichengreen, Restructuring Sovereign Debt, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 75, 77 (2003); Kenneth 
M. Kletzer, Sovereign Bond Restructuring: Collective Action Clauses and Official Crisis Intervention 17–18 (Int’l 
Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 03/134, 2003), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2003/wp03134.pdf. 
11. See Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 6, at 1629–30, 1640. 
12. As a theoretical matter, one might use the term CAC to encompass a variety of  contract 
terms designed to ease bondholder coordination problems. For example, (1) trustee clauses empower 
a trustee to act on behalf  of  bondholders collectively; (2) bondholder committee or representative 
clauses allow for the creation of  a committee or the appointment of  a representative to negotiate on 
behalf  of  bondholders after a default, but not to make binding decisions; (3) acceleration clauses 
prevent bondholders from demanding full payment of  their principal after a default, unless a defined 
percentage of  the group approves the demand; (4) modification clauses allow a defined percentage 
of  bondholders to approve a restructuring proposal in a vote that will bind all holders of  that bond; 
and (5) aggregation clauses allow for a similar vote to occur across different bond issues. For 
descriptions of  these variations, see Michael Bradley & G. Mitu Gulati, Collective Action Clauses for 
the Eurozone: An Empirical Analysis (Mar. 28, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (manuscript at 17–
25), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1948534; Weidemaier & Gulati, supra note 8, (manuscript at 
5–7). 
13. See Weidemaier & Gulati, supra note 8, (manuscript at 5–6). 
14. See, e.g., SUSAN SCHADLER, CTR. FOR INT’L GOVERNANCE INNOVATION & INST. FOR NEW 
ECON. THINKING, CIGI PAPER NO. 6, SOVEREIGN DEBTORS IN DISTRESS: ARE OUR 
INSTITUTIONS UP TO THE CRISIS? 15 (2012), available at 
http://www.cigionline.org/publications/2012/8/sovereign-debtors-distress-are-our-institutions-up-
challenge (referring to such clauses as majority enforcement clauses). 
15. Id. 
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also reduce the need for bailouts. Proponents believed that private 
investors would be more willing to accept a restructuring if  they were not 
worried that holdouts would later extract a better deal.  
In February 2003, this policy idea became reality. After a long Treasury-
led campaign, a major sovereign issuer, Mexico, issued New York-law 
bonds with both types of  CACs: collective modification and collective 
acceleration provisions.16 In the wake of  Mexico’s issuance, many other 
countries also adopted these terms in New York-law bonds.17 More 
significantly, CACs have assumed pride of  place as a key component of  
the official sector’s response to sovereign debt crises.18 So entrenched are 
CACs in this role that today — nearly a decade later — they have swiftly 
emerged as a key piece of  the Eurozone’s response to its crisis.19 As we 
write, some reformers even propose CACs as a solution to the woes of  the 
U.S. municipal bond market.20 
Proposals to reform sovereign bond contracts, however, encounter an 
objection. The bonds are drafted and traded by sophisticated actors in 
thick markets. If  market actors have not already chosen to use CACs, 
perhaps these terms are not such a good idea after all. Over time, a 
market-failure story emerged to counter this objection. The story 
emphasized history and, in its simplest form, posited that CACs were a 
novel innovation necessary to address modern problems that market 
participants did not yet fully understand.21 In the jargon of  our economist 
colleagues, market actors had been operating with incomplete information.  
In this paper, we will examine this narrative against the historical record. 
In doing so, we hope to advance the literature in two respects. First, most 
of  the attention in reform debates has focused on modification clauses, 
which, as a reminder, allow for a collectively binding restructuring vote. 
But collective acceleration clauses were also a key part of  reform proposals 
in the 1990s and early 2000s. We will present evidence that collective 
acceleration clauses have been used  in sovereign bonds for nearly a 
century. Second, we have found that collective modification clauses have also 
been in use for much longer than is commonly believed but that market 
                                                          
16. JOHN DRAGE & CATHERINE HOVAGUIMIAN, COLLECTIVE ACTION CLAUSES (CACS): AN 
ANALYSIS OF PROVISIONS INCLUDED IN RECENT SOVEREIGN BOND ISSUES 2 (2004), available at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/fsr/2004/fsr17art9.pdf. 
17. See infra Figure 1 and Table 1. 
18. See infra Part I. 
19. See infra Part I.B. 
20. See, e.g., Field Hearing on the State of  the Municipal Securities Market Before the Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 
5–6 (July 29, 2011) (statement of  James E. Spiotto, Chapman & Cutler LLP) [hereinafter Remarks of  
James E. Spiotto], available at 
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/municipalsecurities/statements072911/spiotto.pdf. Thanks to Anna 
Gelpern for pointing us to this material. 
21. See infra Part I. 
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participants did not (at least until recently) seem to assign these clauses 
much value. Indeed, we will recount episodes in which protracted debt-
restructuring negotiations took place without any of  the involved parties seeming 
to notice that the relevant debt already included modification clauses. These findings 
undercut the historical narrative supporting pro-CAC initiatives, which 
posits that CACs are novel clauses that were unfamiliar to market 
participants. To the contrary, the evidence suggests that market 
participants were well-aware of  CACs but did not believe them to be a 
necessary feature of  sovereign bond documentation.  
We have no quarrel with the current CAC initiative in the Eurozone. 
And we accept that CACs can reduce the barriers to restructuring in at 
least some cases. Rather, we contend that the pro-CAC historical narrative 
rests on flawed premises. CACs have been in use for nearly a century, 
including in some Eurozone local-law bonds, which are the focus of  the 
current Eurozone reform efforts. For most of  that century, however, 
drafters used other clauses, such as trustee clauses, to facilitate bondholder 
coordination and to limit the power of  holdout creditors to disrupt a 
restructuring. What the pro-CAC narrative fails to explain is why CACs, so 
long a marginal part of  sovereign bond documentation, have now become 
integral to the proper management of  public debt crises. Without such an 
explanation, CACs look less like a promising policy innovation and more 
like the latest fashion in financial-market reform. 
I. THE MODERN CAC LEGEND 
The crises of  the 1990s and 2000s prompted much reflection on the 
sovereign debt markets and the lack of  a bankruptcy-type mechanism to 
deal with insolvent sovereigns. Such reflection was not new; academics, 
lawyers, and policymakers have long engaged these questions, although 
they have not always agreed on the problems or their solutions.22 By the 
mid-1990s, however, problems of  collective action and moral hazard were 
the primary topics of  discussion. The bond markets had sprung back to 
life after the Latin American debt crisis of  the 1980s, and some feared that 
this development, along with the interconnected nature of  global markets, 
might exacerbate these problems.23 By the early 2000s, the debate had 
focused on two competing approaches.24 One proposal, introduced by 
                                                          
22. See, e.g., Kenneth Rogoff  & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Bankruptcy Procedures for Sovereigns: A History 
of  Ideas, 1976–2001, 49 IMF STAFF PAPERS 470 (2002), available at 
http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/staffp/2002/03/pdf/rogoff.pdf. 
23. See BARRY EICHENGREEN & RICHARD PORTES, CTR. FOR ECON. POLICY RESEARCH, 
CRISIS? WHAT CRISIS? ORDERLY WORKOUTS FOR SOVEREIGN DEBTORS (1995); Richard Portes, 
Resolution of  Sovereign Debt Crises: The New Old Framework (Ctr. for Econ. Policy Research, Discussion 
Paper No. 4714, 2004), available at http://faculty.london.edu/rportes/DP4717.pdf. 
24. For recountings of  the battle between the competing approaches, see Gelpern & Gulati, supra 
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International Monetary Fund (IMF) Deputy Director Anne Krueger, 
called for the creation of  an IMF-run bankruptcy court for sovereigns.25 
The competing plan, introduced by John Taylor, Under Secretary for 
International Affairs at the U.S. Department of  the Treasury, proposed 
inducing market participants to design contracts that would address 
concerns about moral hazard and bondholder coordination.26 The latter 
was the CAC solution.27  
As noted, the debate centered around New York-law bonds, nearly all 
of  which gave bondholders the individual right to opt out of  a 
restructuring. Proponents of  contract reform needed to explain why they 
knew better than the market, which apparently had rejected the use of  
CACs.28 The story that emerged, which we explore further below, was an 
historical one that combined several discrete ideas: 
Bond lending poses unique coordination problems. In the 1970s and early 1980s, 
commercial-bank syndicates made most private loans to emerging-market 
sovereigns.29 These banks can coordinate their response to a financial crisis 
whether or not the loan contract says anything helpful on the subject. 
Commercial banks are relatively few in number, have close relationships 
with each other, and are vulnerable to arm-twisting by national regulators. 
Bondholders, by contrast, are widely dispersed, may have divergent 
interests, and are less subject to regulatory pressure. Bondholders are more 
likely to hold out from a restructuring in the hope of  obtaining a better 
deal for themselves. Because holdouts can protract or derail a 
restructuring, bondholders should prefer, ex ante, contracts that allow a 
majority vote to bind dissenters as well. The puzzle was why New York-
law bonds lacked such terms. 
Markets were not designing the right contracts. The second idea purported to 
solve the puzzle. Contracts are tools for managing risk. If  New York-law 
bonds posed a risk that holdouts would disrupt a restructuring, one would 
expect lawyers to design contracts to solve the problem. Why was this not 
happening? Policymakers gradually settled on an explanation: because the 
bond markets had been dormant for so long, the lawyers involved in bond 
                                                                                                                                      
note 6, at 1649–60; Portes, supra note 23; see also RODRIGO OLIVARES-CAMINAL, LEGAL ASPECTS OF 
SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING (2009); MAURO MEGLIONI, SOVEREIGN DEBT: GENESIS-
RESTRUCTURING-LITIGATION (forthcoming 2013) (on file with authors). 
25. See Anne O. Krueger & Sean Hagan, Sovereign Workouts: An IMF Perspective, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 
203 (2005); Sean Hagan, Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure Sovereign Debt, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 
390 (2005).  
26. See Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 6, at 1639, 1653. 
27. See id. (describing the speech and reactions to it).  
28. See Eichengreen, supra note 10, at 86. 
29. See Blaise Gadanecz, The Syndicated Loan Market: Structure, Development and Implications, BIS Q. 
REV., Dec. 2004, at 75, 75–76; see also Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards: The 
Role of Litigation in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1043, 1054 (2004) (describing the 
impetus for this trend in Latin America). 
2013] A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF CACS  57 
deals did not recognize or know how to solve the collective-action 
concerns raised by bond lending. In fact, lawyers knew so little that they 
supposedly documented sovereign bond deals simply by copying terms 
from corporate bonds.30 
Public actors could help solve the problem. The story thus far is a simple tale 
of  market failure. The third idea, then, was that public actors should 
intervene to help fix the market. For example, committees could design 
model contract terms, which regulators could pressure market participants 
to adopt. Once they saw the value of  these terms, market participants 
would willingly adopt them in all contracts. 
For policymakers, these ideas converged into a simple narrative: Bond 
lending posed new problems requiring new tools (i.e., CACs) to solve 
them, but the market was not innovating and needed help from the public 
sector. Once CACs were incorporated into sovereign bonds, private 
lenders would be more likely to participate in a sovereign debt 
restructuring. This trend would reduce the need for official intervention 
and give private lenders an incentive to lend more prudently.  
If  one accepts this story, there is little to be said against CACs. Who 
objects to prudent lending? But does the narrative hold up as an historical 
matter?  Was the market unaware or unable to develop the CAC solution 
on its own, without official intervention? 
 Before we turn to the historical foundations of  this narrative, we 
discuss how CACs assumed the prominence they enjoy today as policy 
tools. That story begins with Mexico’s inclusion of  CACs in its 2003 
issuance of  New York-law bonds. 
A. The Ascendance of  CACs  Mexico, 2003 
Mexico’s bond issue in February 2003 rendered the debate between 
bankruptcy and CAC solutions a thing of  the past. Focusing only on 
collective modification clauses, Figure 1 shows how the vast New York 
market turned on a dime. Before 2003, only a handful of  New York-law 
bonds included collective modification clauses. After 2003, these clauses 
appeared in nearly every issuance.31 
                                                          
30. For a description of the U.S. Treasury’s efforts, and an explanation of such market practices, 
see Randal Quarles, Herding Cats: Collective Action Clauses in Sovereign Debt  The Genesis of the Project to 
Change Market Practice in 2001 through 2003, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29 (2010). For a discussion 
of some of the private-sector views on this and competing initiatives, see Robert B. Gray, Crisis 
Resolution: A Market-Based Approach, in COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT, ECONOMIC PAPER NO. 49, 
ENHANCING PRIVATE CAPITAL FLOWS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE NEW 
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 33 (Stephany Griffith-Jones, Amar Bhattacharya & Andreas Antoniou 
eds., 2003). 
31. For additional details, see Bradley & Gulati, supra note 12; Weidemaier & Gulati, supra note 8. 
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As we have explained, the pro-CAC historical narrative emerged to 
explain this transition and to justify the role of  official-sector actors in 
promoting the switch. This narrative has several parts. 
1. New Problems Require New Solutions  
The first part of  the Mexico story emphasizes the novelty of  the 
collective-action problems posed by bond lending, and thus the novelty of  
CACs as a solution. Although the sovereign bond markets were vibrant 
throughout much of  the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the 
Depression brought bond lending to an abrupt halt. Countries continued 
to issue bonds sporadically and in small amounts, but the market did not 
revive in earnest until the 1990s.32 In the intervening decades, sovereign 
lending primarily took the form of  direct loans by governments, 
multilateral lenders such as the World Bank, or syndicates of  commercial 
banks.33 It was not until after the Brady Plan that the sovereign bond 
markets once again became the primary means of  external sovereign 
borrowing.34 
For these reasons, as the story goes, the lawyers responsible for 
documenting sovereign bond issues in the 1980s and 1990s were primarily 
familiar with commercial loans. Commercial banks have a relatively easy 
time coordinating their response to a sovereign’s financial distress.35 Thus, 
                                                          
32. For a discussion of  the evolution of  the sovereign bond markets, see Marc Flandreau, Juan 
Flores, Norbert Gaillard & Sebastián Nieto-Parra, The End of  Gatekeeping: Underwriters and the Quality 
of  Sovereign Bond Markets 1815–2007 (Nat’l Bureau of  Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15128, 
2009); Marc Flandreau, Norbert Gaillard & Ugo Panizza, Conflicts of  Interest, Reputation, and the Interwar 
Debt Crisis: Banksters or Bad Luck?  (Graduate Inst. of  Int’l & Dev. Studies, HEID Working Paper No. 
02/2010, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1588031.  
33. See Gadanecz, supra note 29. 
34. See Udaibir Das et al., Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1950–2010: Literature Survey, Data, and Stylized 
Facts 18 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 12/203, 2012) (“The Brady Plan can . . . be seen as 
the start of  modern-era sovereign bond trading.”). 
35. To be clear, we are recounting the general story, not stating an empirical fact. We do not wish 
to understate the difficulties involved in coordinating the response of  commercial banks to sovereign 
financial crisis. See Richard Portes, The Role of  Institutions for Collective Action, in MANAGING 
FINANCIAL AND CORPORATE DISTRESS: LESSONS FROM ASIA 47, 63 (Charles Adams et al. eds., 
0
20
40
Figure 1. Collective modification clauses in bonds governed by New York law.
With collective modification Total
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the lawyers were unfamiliar with the collective-action problems posed by 
bond lending. Because of  their inexperience with sovereign bonds, lawyers 
(allegedly) based the new sovereign bond documents on the closest 
template they could find: cross-border corporate bonds.36 In the United 
States, the Trust Indenture Act37 forbids the use of  collective modification 
clauses in corporate bonds.38 The architects of  this prohibition viewed 
bankruptcy as the preferable alternative.39 For sovereigns, however, 
bankruptcy is not an available option. Had lawyers been more attentive to 
the need to provide for a coordinated workout process, they would have 
modified corporate bonds to make them suitable for sovereign borrowers. 
Alas, their inexperience with bond lending meant that they did little more 
than copy the corporate template.  
We have described this story in other work, where we also explain why 
it is a flawed description of  the contracts produced during this era.40 The 
story is important, however, because it provided CAC proponents with a 
justification for official-sector intervention in the bond markets. The story 
attributed the absence of  CACs from the market for New York-law bonds 
to ignorance rather than investor preference. It also offered a basis for 
dismissing contrary evidence, such as the inconvenient fact that most 
English-law bonds drafted in the 1980s and 1990s did include CACs, as did 
a handful of  New York-law bonds.41 According to the story, this too was 
the result of  copying — only the lawyers involved had copied English-law 
corporate bonds, or sovereign bonds derived from that template.42 Because 
of  legal differences between the markets, the English-law corporate 
template included CACs.43 By positing that lawyers neither anticipated 
bondholder-coordination problems nor designed contract terms to address 
them, the story provided a basis for government intervention. 
                                                                                                                                      
2000).  
36. See Weidemaier & Gulati, supra note 8, (manuscript at 11–12). 
37. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa–bbbb (2012). 
38. Id. § 77ppp. 
39. Mark J. Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 YALE L.J. 232, 234 (1987). 
40. See Weidemaier & Gulati, supra note 8, (manuscript at 16–26). 
41. See Weidemaier & Gulati, supra note 8, (manuscript at 17) (discussing English law drafting 
practices); infra Part II.B.2.b (discussing early CACs in New York). 
42. We discuss this story in more detail below. See infra Part II.B.2.b.  
43. See Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will, 51 EMORY L.J. 
1317, 1324–26 (2002). The copying story drew further support from the fact that English-law CACs 
might, in theory, allow a restructuring to proceed with the support of only a minority of bondholders. 
See Weidemaier & Gulati, supra note 8, (manuscript at 22–23). To many observers, this feature made 
English-law CACs seem ill-suited for the sovereign context. See GROUP OF TEN, REPORT OF THE G-
10 WORKING GROUP ON CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES 3–4 (2002) [hereinafter G-10 REPORT], available 
at http://www.bis.org/publ/gten08.htm.  
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2. The Public Sector as a Driver of  Innovation 
The typical CAC narrative highlights Mexico’s 2003 issuance as the key 
turning point.44 Part of  the story is that Mexico’s status as a market leader 
was crucial to the shift in New York-law bonds.45 As the story goes, 
however, even Mexico would not have moved without substantial 
involvement by the public sector. 
One critical intervention took place in 1996, when a report 
commissioned by the G-10 countries, the so-called “Rey Report,” 
recommended altering sovereign bonds to mitigate the collective-action 
concerns inherent in bond lending.46 The Rey Report precipitated a spate 
of  articles, policy reports, and reform proposals, many of  which were 
organized by public-sector actors.47 By late 2002, a G-10 committee of  
experts had produced a set of  model CACs for issuers to adopt. Among 
these model CACs, a modification clause allowed holders of  75% of  the 
debt to bind dissenting creditors to a restructuring, and an acceleration 
clause denied individual bondholders the right to accelerate the debt after a 
default and instead made the decision to accelerate a collective one that 
could be made by holders of  25% of  the debt and reversed by a 50% 
vote.48 
More importantly, U.S. Treasury officials launched a behind-the-scenes 
campaign, exhorting, educating, and arm-twisting in an effort to promote 
the use of  these or competing model CACs in sovereign bonds.49 When 
the market switched after Mexico’s 2003 issuance, these events seemed to 
merge into a coherent narrative: the market, because of  incomplete 
information, had failed to design contract terms appropriate to the new 
world of  sovereign bond lending. An education initiative led by the public 
sector — involving seminars, meetings, academic papers, etc. — had 
                                                          
44. See, e.g., Eichengreen, supra note 10, at 87; MEGLIONI, supra note 24, at ch. 11; Sönke Häseler, 
Collective Action Clauses in International Sovereign Bond Contracts — Whence the Opposition, 23 J. ECON. 
SURVS. 882, 886–87 (2009). 
45. This is because many market participants worried that CACs would raise their borrowing 
costs. The fear had some grounding in theory: if  CACs reduce the need for bailouts and facilitate 
“private sector involvement” in debt restructuring, private lenders might price this risk into their 
loans. On the other hand, CACs might also reduce the cost associated with protracted restructuring 
negotiations, and this might lower borrowing costs. Without a test case, it was not clear that any 
country would risk adding CACs to their bonds. Moreover, the test case could not be a small country 
on the market periphery. No one would follow the lead of  such a bit player. Only a market leader 
could prompt a widespread change in contracts. For a discussion of  the first-mover and negative-
signal stories, see Häseler, supra note 44, at 9–12.  
46. See G-10 REPORT, supra note 43. 
47. Examples of the genre include Barry Eichengreen & Ashoka Mody, Would Collective Action 
Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs? An Update and Additional Results (World Bank, Working Paper No. 2363, 
2000); Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 43. For a general discussion of reform proposals, see 
Weidemaier & Gulati, supra note 8, (manuscript at 9–12).  
48. See G-10 REPORT, supra note 43, at 10–13. 
49. See Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 6, at 1670–71. 
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overcome this failure, and market-driven innovation had taken over in early 
2003. By late 2003, the vast majority of  new sovereign bonds issued under 
New York law used CACs. The key players took victory laps.50 
B. Europe, 2013 
The historical narrative supporting CACs is more extensive and 
nuanced than we have captured in our brief  discussion. In many ways, 
however, that is the point. Narratives are effective because they are 
compelling, or at least useful, rather than because they are true. And this 
simple narrative — CACs were a new solution to a new problem that few 
understood, and therefore markets had failed to adopt them — was useful. 
It gave policymakers something concrete that they could do to help solve a 
perceived problem. Much Eurozone debt, it turns out, derives from bonds 
that do not include CACs.51 When a new crisis emerged in Europe, and 
when taxpayers again revolted at the perceived cost of  bailing out heavily 
indebted countries, CACs emerged as part of  the solution.52  
By the time of  the Eurozone crisis, nearly a decade had passed since 
Mexico’s 2003 issuance. Yet reformers again encountered the inconvenient 
fact that many sovereigns issued bonds without CACs.53 Once again, 
however, there was an explanation. Unlike the emerging-market bonds that 
prompted reform efforts in the 1990s and early 2000s, which were 
governed by New York law, much of  the relevant European debt involves 
bonds governed by the issuing country’s local law.54 The sovereign debt 
markets are notoriously segmented,55 and the dividing line is the law that 
governs the issuance.56 Thus, perhaps CACs had simply not yet caught on 
                                                          
50. See TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 129–30; Quarles, supra note 30, at 29; Sergio J. Galvis & Angel L. 
Saad, Collective Action Clauses: Recent Progress and Challenges Ahead, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 713 (2004). 
51. See, e.g., Lee C. Buchheit & Mitu Gulati, How to Restructure Greek Debt (May 7, 2010) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1603304. 
52. See Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, The Wonder-Clause, 41 J. COMP. ECON. 367 (2013). 
53. Id. at 367–77. Another inconvenient fact is that, as Greece’s restructuring has shown, it turns 
out to be relatively easy to restructure local-law bonds even though they do not include CACs. This is 
because virtually all of  these bonds are governed by the issuing country’s law and can be restructured 
by changing that law. Greece, for example, changed its law to provide that a supermajority vote in 
favor of  restructuring would bind every bondholder — in effect, retroactively inserting a CAC into 
the bonds. See Jeromin Zettelmeyer et al., The Greek Debt Restructuring: An Autopsy 11–12 (Peterson 
Inst. for Int’l Econ., Working Paper No. 2013-13-8, 2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2144932. 
54. See Jeromin Zettelmeyer & Mitu Gulati, In the Slipstream of  the Greek Exchange, VOXEU, Mar. 5, 
2012, http://www.voxeu.org/article/slipstream-greek-debt-exchange. 
55. As just one sign of market segmentation, it has been asserted that drafters “slavishly follow” 
practices in their market. See Gray, supra note 30, at 36. 
56. For a discussion of the typical correlations between choice of  law and contract provisions in 
the New York and London markets in particular, see Lee C. Buchheit, Choice of Law Clauses and 
Regulatory Statutes, 15 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 11 (1996). This is why, according to the pro-CAC narrative, 
English-law bonds included CACs but New York-law bonds did not — the lawyers began by copying 
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in the local-law market. In that case, the parallel to the New York-law 
market was obvious, and so was the solution. An expert committee formed 
for the purpose of  developing a standardized CAC, and Eurozone leaders 
have mandated the use of  this clause in all Eurozone bonds issued after 
2012.57  
In the following sections, we examine the historical narrative supporting 
these CAC initiatives. We feel obliged to repeat that we have no objection 
to CACs and even assume that they may facilitate restructuring in some 
cases. Nor do we dispute that the public sector played a key role in 
prompting the widespread use of  these terms. But market participants did 
not need to be educated about CACs. These clauses have appeared in 
sovereign bonds for a very long time, but they have never been viewed as a 
necessary part of  bond documentation, much less as a panacea for the 
macroeconomic problems arising from sovereign financial distress. 
II. NOTHING NEW UNDER THE SUN 
Because of  the episodic, recurring nature of  sovereign financial crises, 
the sovereign debt literature often draws lessons from history.58 We are 
especially interested in the historical study of  contracts. Our data set 
includes approximately 2,700 sovereign bond contracts and disclosure 
documents drawn from a variety of  sources and covering the period 1823–
2012.59  
                                                                                                                                      
different forms. 
57. The Eurozone-wide mandate ensures that there will be no first-mover penalty. See supra note 
45 and accompanying text. The leaders of  wealthy Eurozone countries have also tried to placate irate 
taxpayers by suggesting that CACs will facilitate private sector involvement in debt restructurings. See 
Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 52, at 374–77.  
58. For a non-inclusive list of  relevant examples from the sovereign debt literature, see Flandreau, 
Gaillard & Panizza, supra note 32; FEDERICO STURZENEGGER & JEROMIN ZETTELMEYER, DEBT 
DEFAULTS AND LESSONS FROM A DECADE OF CRISES (2006);  Rogoff  & Zettelmeyer, supra note 22; 
Barry Eichengreen, Historical Research on International Lending and Debt, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 149, 162–65 
(1991); THE INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISIS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (Barry Eichengreen & 
Peter H. Lindert eds., 1989); Barry Eichengreen & Richard Portes, Debt and Default in the 1930s: Causes 
and Consequences, 30 EUR. ECON. REV. 599 (1986); CHARLES LIPSON, STANDING GUARD: 
PROTECTING FOREIGN CAPITAL IN THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES (1985); 
Albert Fishlow, Lessons from the Past: Capital Markets During the 19th Century and the Interwar Period, 39 
INT’L ORG. 383 (1985). 
59. The appendix reports the 2,030 sovereign issues for which we have relatively complete 
information about bond terms, meaning one or more of the following documents: the full 
prospectus, a physical copy of the bond, or the loan contract between the issuer and the underwriting 
or managing banks. For some early sovereign issues, we could not locate one of these documents and 
relied instead on excerpts of bond terms published in the newspaper. We exclude this subset from 
the results reported in the text. 
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A. Description of  the Data 
Conceptually, the data set has two parts, distinguished by our method of  
data collection. The first part extends from 1820 to roughly 1980. For that 
era, it is difficult to find a centralized source of  bond documents. Stock-
exchange archives include prospectuses and other sales documents for 
bonds listed on that exchange. We visited the archives for the New York 
Stock Exchange at the Library of  Congress and for the London Stock 
Exchange at Guildhall. We took digital images of  sales documents in each 
of  these archives.  
Sales documents typically describe or reprint key bond terms. It is 
possible, however, that the underlying loan contract between the issuer and 
the underwriting banks also contained important terms. Moreover, not 
every sovereign bond issue was listed on an exchange. Thus, we gathered 
additional documents from the archives of  major banks, including 
Rothschild, Barings, UBS, HSBC, as well as the J.P. Morgan archives at the 
Morgan Library & Museum. We also visited other collections of  sovereign 
bonds and sales documents, as well as some collections of  personal papers 
from prominent bankers, at Columbia University, Cornell University, Duke 
University, Harvard Business School, the Origins of  Value Museum at Yale 
University, and the Wertpapierwelt Museum of  Historical Shares and 
Bonds.60  
The second portion of  our data set consists of  documents gathered 
from public databases, which provide fairly comprehensive data on 
sovereign bonds issued between approximately 1980 and 2011. We 
primarily gathered data from Thomson One Banker, but we supplemented 
this research with data from Perfect Information.61 There are undoubtedly 
gaps in the data. With respect to pre-War bonds, for example, we have only 
a few offerings from the Amsterdam market of  the early 1800s, and we 
probably under-sample bonds that were issued on the Paris market. 
Moreover, except for bonds issued by Eurozone countries, only a handful 
of  bonds in the data set were issued in domestic currencies. Most were 
also issued under foreign law. This predominance of  foreign currency and 
foreign law implies that the bonds in our data set were marketed primarily 
to foreign investors. So does the fact that we draw most of  our modern 
bonds from pay databases.62  
The Appendix provides more detailed description of  the data set. 
Except where otherwise noted, we focus in this paper on bonds issued in 
                                                          
60. Where we could, we supplemented the materials with information from contemporaneous 
newspaper advertisements and investor reports. 
61. Because of  differences in search capability, we used Perfect Information to collect 
information on bonds that were guaranteed but not issued by sovereigns.  
62. Domestic investors lending in local currency under local law are not likely to be as concerned 
about contract protections and may be unwilling to pay for access to copies of  bond-contract terms. 
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the London and New York markets. Those markets were the locus of  
reform efforts in the 1990s and 2000s and figure prominently in the pro-
CAC narrative. 
B. A Contracts History of  the Bond Markets 
As noted, explanations for the absence of  CACs in New York-law 
bonds — and the puzzling fact that CACs were present in English-law 
bonds — stressed that lawyers did not understand the coordination 
problems inherent in sovereign bond lending or know how to design 
appropriate contracts. In the next sections, we explain how the historical 
record undermines this understanding. 
We focus first on collective acceleration clauses. The modern pro-CAC 
narrative focuses almost exclusively on collective-modification rights. But 
acceleration rights also featured prominently in the reform debates of  the 
1990s and early 2000s.63 Their prominence in those debates is not 
surprising. In theory, contracts can address bondholder-coordination 
problems in many ways, even without allowing for collective 
modification.64 Collective acceleration clauses limit the power of  holdouts to 
disrupt a restructuring through litigation.65 Sharing clauses remove the 
incentive to hold out by requiring a lender who receives a disproportionate 
payment to share the payment pro rata with other lenders.66 Trustee clauses 
serve a similar function by appointing a trustee to advance the interests of  
bondholders as a group.67 Other types of  collective representation are also 
possible, such as clauses providing for the appointment of  a bondholder 
committee to negotiate a debt restructuring with the issuer.68 All of  these 
possible reforms were debated in the years before Mexico’s 2003 
issuance.69 
Because of  its myopic focus on collective modification, the modern 
pro-CAC narrative overlooks a great deal of  historical context. As we 
explain, CACs — defined in the broader sense as clauses designed to 
remedy bondholder-coordination problems — have been around for 
nearly a century. The clauses never became a standard feature of  bond 
                                                          
63. See G-10 REPORT, supra note 43. 
64. For a discussion of the potential value of  collective modification clauses, see Lee C. Buchheit, 
Majority Action Clauses May Help Resolve Debt Crises, INT’L FIN. L. REV., Aug. 1998, at 13. 
65. See G-10 REPORT, supra note 43, at 6, 13. 
66. See Lee C. Buchheit, Changing Bond Documentation: The Sharing Clause, INT’L FIN. L. REV., July 
1998, at 17. 
67. See Lee C. Buchheit, The Collective Representation Clause, INT’L FIN. L. REV., Sept. 1998, at 9. 
68. See id. at 11. 
69. See, e.g., GROUP OF TEN, THE RESOLUTION OF SOVEREIGN LIQUIDITY CRISES: A REPORT 
TO THE MINISTERS AND GOVERNORS PREPARED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE DEPUTIES 17, 44, 
58 (1996), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/gten03.pdf. 
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contracts, however, and there is little evidence that market participants 
assigned them much value. 
1. Collective Acceleration Clauses in Earlier Eras of  Bond Lending 
Collective acceleration clauses limit the ability of  individual 
bondholders to demand full payment of  principal after a default. If  the 
issuer misses a payment, for example, bondholders as a group might be 
better off  allowing it some time to get its financial footing and resume 
payments. Individual bondholders, however, may be quick to accelerate, 
and the collective impact of  these individual decisions may leave them all 
worse off. A modern clause reads something like this: 
If  an event of  default . . . occurs and is continuing, the holders of  
at least 25% of  the aggregate principal amount of  the outstanding 
global bonds may . . . declare all the global bonds to be due and 
payable immediately . . . . The holders of  66 2/3% or more of  the 
aggregate principal amount of  the outstanding global bonds may 
rescind a declaration of  acceleration if  the event or events of  
default giving rise to the declaration have been cured or waived.70 
In the run-up to Mexico, acceleration clauses were a major part of  
proposed contractual reforms to deal with collective-action problems.71 A 
well-designed clause, reformers claimed, could prevent holdout creditors 
from using litigation to deny a sovereign the “breathing room” needed to 
get its financial house in order.72 Of  course, if  litigation were really so 
disruptive, one might wonder why these clauses were not already in 
widespread use. The answer cannot be that clauses of  this sort were 
unknown to the market. To the contrary, acceleration clauses almost 
exactly like the one reprinted above have appeared in sovereign bonds for 
nearly a century. A 1923 issuance in New York by the Kingdom of  the 
Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes contained the following clause: 
In case [of  default] . . . the Bankers shall, if  requested so to do by a 
writing signed by the holders of  twenty-five per cent (25%) in 
amount of  the bonds then outstanding, declare the principal of  all 
the bonds then outstanding to be due and payable immediately . . . . 
[H]owever . . . if  within one year after such declaration the default 
on the part of  the Government shall have been made good to the 
satisfaction of  the Bankers, then . . . the holders of  a majority in 
amount of  the Bonds then outstanding, by written notice to the 
                                                          
70. Prospectus Supplement, Federative Republic of  Brazil 10.25% Global BRL Bonds, p. S-27 
(May 10, 2007). 
71. See G-10 REPORT, supra note 43. 
72. See id.  
66 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 54:1 
Bankers, may waive such default and rescind and annul such 
declaration of  maturity . . . .73 
Our research turned up a number of  clauses similar to this one.74 
Focusing on the pre-World War II period, our data set includes 460 bonds 
issued between 1822 and 1945. Of  these, twenty-three bonds include 
collective-acceleration provisions. These clauses began to appear in the late 
nineteenth century, although they are concentrated in the first few decades 
of  the twentieth. 
Modern sovereign bonds are often assumed to be boilerplate,75 but 
these early bonds varied in their use of  collective acceleration clauses. For 
one thing, countries that used these terms did not use them in each 
issuance.76 We also see no evidence that the clauses can be attributed to a 
single entity, such as an investment bank. Indeed, bonds with collective 
acceleration clauses were underwritten by a number of  different banks. 
Finally, and most importantly, the clauses did not follow a standard 
template. Sovereigns adopted different thresholds, ranging from 5% to 
50%.77 Other clauses allocated the acceleration decision to the lead bank in 
the underwriting syndicate or to the authenticating agent.78 In other cases, 
the bond also provided for a trustee to represent the interests of  
                                                          
73. Kingdom of  the Serbs, Croats & Slovenes, General Bond Listing Application, National 
External Goal Loan, Forty-Year Eight Per Cent. Secured External Gold Coupon Bonds, at 10–11 
(Aug. 10, 1922). 
74. See, e.g., Kingdom of  Hungary, Listing Application, Hungarian Consolidated Municipal Loan, 
Twenty-Year 7% Secured Sinking Fund Gold (Coupon) Bonds External Loan of  1926 (Sept. 21, 
1927); Province of  Upper Austria (Land Oberosterreich) (Republic of  Austria), Listing Application, 
External Secured Sinking Fund Six and One-Half  Per Cent. Gold Bonds (Apr. 16, 1928); City of  
Cordoba (Argentine Republic), Listing Application, Ten-Year 7% External Sinking Fund Gold Bonds 
of  1927 (Mar. 16, 1928); Kingdom of  Roumania Monopolies Institute, Loan Agreement, 7% 
Guaranteed External Sinking Fund Gold Bonds Stabilization and Development Loan of  1929 (Feb. 
1, 1929); Agreement between Province of  Silesia, Republic of  Poland and the First National Bank of  
Boston (June 1, 1928); State Mortgage Bank of  Yugoslavia, Indenture and General Bond (Apr. 1, 
1933); Conversion Office for German Foreign Debts (Konversionskasse Für Deutsche 
Auslandsschulden), Prospectus, 3% Dollar Bonds (Mar. 8, 1937); Union of  South Africa, Prospectus, 
External Loan Bonds of  December 1, 1955 (Nov. 29, 1955); Union of  South Africa, Prospectus, 
External Loan Bonds of  December 1, 1958 (Dec. 2, 1958). 
75. W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Disputing Boilerplate, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 2 (2009). 
76. Peru, for example, issued bonds in 1924 without collective acceleration clauses but included 
the clauses in bonds issued in 1927. Compare Republic of  Peru, Listing Application, Sanitation Loan 
Series of  1924 (Dec. 12, 1924), with Republic of  Peru, Listing Application, Secured 7% Sinking Fund 
Gold Bonds (Sept. 15, 1927). 
77. See, e.g., Chilean Consolidated Municipal Loan, Listing Application, Grace National Bank of  
New York Interim Receipts for Thirty-One Year 7% External Sinking Fund Gold Bonds, Series A, 
1929 (Feb. 3, 1930) (5%); Republic of  Bolivia, Listing Application, External Twenty-Five Year 
Secured Refunding Eight Per Cent. Sinking Fund Gold Coupon Bonds (May 23, 1923) (10%; trustee 
administered); Department of  Cauca Valley (Republic of  Colombia) Listing Application, 7.5% Bonds 
(Aug. 15, 1927) (50%). 
78. See Conversion Office for German Foreign Debts (Konversionskasse Für Deutsche 
Auslandsschulden), Prospectus, 3% Dollar Bonds (Mar. 8, 1937). 
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bondholders; in these bonds, the acceleration clause allowed a defined 
percentage of  bondholders to force the trustee to declare a default.79 In 
this subset of  bonds, some clauses also established a voting threshold that 
would allow bondholders to reverse the trustee’s decision to accelerate; 
others were silent on the subject.80  
From all of  this, it is clear that collective acceleration clauses have been 
part of  the sovereign debt landscape for nearly a century. The clauses were 
hardly universal, but they appeared commonly enough, and in enough 
variety, that it seems plausible to infer that market participants were aware 
of  the potential hazards of  uncoordinated bondholder action and viewed 
collective acceleration clauses as one (but only one) possible solution. We 
find no indication in the historical record that the clauses were considered 
remarkable or that there was any difficulty in using them when necessary.81 
Yet there is equally little evidence that market participants viewed 
collective acceleration as a necessary part of  a rational sovereign debt 
regime. 
Indeed, reform projects at the time, such as the League of  Nations 
project to design model terms for international financial contracts, were 
acutely aware of  coordination problems among bondholders and banks. In 
1939, the League’s Committee for the Study of  International Loan 
Contracts produced a report and model clauses designed to address 
coordination problems that might occur throughout a loan’s life cycle — 
from issuance through default.82 With respect to bond issuance, for 
example, the report lamented the recurrent pattern of  “excessive and 
unco-ordinated lending” and the inability to rely on underwriting banks to 
ensure that the borrowing country’s aggregate debt level remained 
                                                          
79. See, e.g., Saxon Public Works, Inc. (Aktiengesellschaft Sächsische Werke), Listing Application, 
20-year Bonds (May 27, 1925) (guaranteed by Free State of  Saxony); German Central Bank for 
Agriculture (Deutsch Rentenbank-Kreditanstalt), Listing Application, 7% Gold Loan (Sept. 10–14, 
1925).  
80. Compare, e.g., Saxon Public Works, Inc. (Aktiengesellschaft Sächsische Werke), Listing 
Application, 20-year Bonds (May 27, 1925) (providing that trustee may accelerate and must accelerate 
upon a 25% vote; silent on reversal of  acceleration), with German Central Bank for Agriculture 
(Deutsch Rentenbank-Kreditanstalt), Listing Application, 7% Gold Loan (Sept. 10-14, 1925) 
(including same provision, except explicitly providing that trustee may waive default upon majority 
vote). 
81. Neither press reports, nor the writings from the time, nor the disclosures on the bonds 
themselves suggest that the use of  acceleration provisions was considered remarkable in any way. For 
general background on the League of  Nations loans, see Yann Decorzant & Juan H. Flores, Public 
Borrowing in Harsh Times: The League of  Nations Loans Revisited (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid 
Working Papers in Econ. History, Working Paper No. 12-07, 2012) (discussing loans and making no 
mention of  acceleration clauses), available at http://e-
archivo.uc3m.es/bitstream/10016/15594/1/wp%2012-07.pdf. 
82. Report of  the Comm. for the Study of  International Loan Contracts, League of  Nations Doc. 
C.145M.93 1939. II.A. (1939) [hereinafter Report on Loan Contracts]. 
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manageable.83 As a solution, the report proposed the appointment of  a 
“small standing body of  recognised financial experts” to opine on the 
wisdom of  proposed loans.84 
With respect to the representation of  bondholder interests during the 
loan and after default, the report devoted extensive discussion to the use 
of  trustees and to entities such as the Corporation of  Foreign 
Bondholders (CFB) and the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council 
(FBPC).85 The Committee also made an additional proposal: the bond 
might designate a representative empowered to negotiate with the issuer 
after default and to issue a decision that would be “binding on all 
bondholders, either absolutely or if  supported by a fixed proportion of  the 
bondholders.”86 The representative could also initiate legal proceedings 
against the debtor, and the report proposed an arbitration mechanism for 
this purpose.87 Here, the report came closest to recommending the use of  
collective acceleration clauses. If  legal proceedings were in the best interest 
of  bondholders, but the representative failed to initiate them, there had to 
be a mechanism for overriding the representative’s decision. At the same 
time, the report’s authors could not imagine giving each individual 
bondholder the right to initiate litigation or arbitration. “Too many 
lawsuits would be a bad thing[,] . . . unpleasant for the debtors [and] their 
Stock Exchange effects would be disastrous in the case of  international 
loans.”88 As a solution, the report proposed that legal proceedings could 
be initiated only if  approved by holders of  5% of  the bonds in 
circulation.89 
At no point, however, did the report explicitly recommend the use of  
collective acceleration clauses. This cannot be because the Committee was 
unfamiliar with them. Its members were major players in the sovereign 
                                                          
83. One problem, the report noted, was the absence of  “machinery for the . . . difficult task of  
co-ordinating different markets.” Id. at 8. 
84. Id. 
85. See id. at 19–21. For a discussion of the history of  the CFB and FBPC generally, see Michael 
R. Adamson, The Failure of  the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council Experiment, 1934–1940, 76 BUS. 
HIST. REV. 479 (2002); Barry Eichengreen & Richard Portes, After the Deluge: Default, Negotiation, and 
Readjustment During the Interwar Years, in THE INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISIS IN HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 12 (Barry Eichengreen & Peter H. Lindert eds., 1989). 
86. Report on Loan Contracts, supra note 82, at 20. This proposal itself  raised bondholder 
coordination problems, which the report took pains to discuss. For example, if  a majority of  
bondholders had to approve a restructuring agreement negotiated by the representative, how to deal 
with the problem of  indifferent or free-riding bondholders? Cf. id. at 33–34. The report proposed a 
rule that a restructuring proposal negotiated by the representative would become binding unless a 
specified percentage of  bondholders — the report suggested 5% but had no firm view on the 
question — requested a meeting to vote on the proposal. Id. at 32–33. 
87. Report on Loan Contracts, supra note 82, at 26–27, 32–33. 
88. Id. at 33. 
89. Id. at 32–33. The report’s draft arbitration clause contained a different threshold (holders of  
not less than 10% of  the outstanding amount of  bonds). Id. at 26. 
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debt world, including representatives from major banks, as well as 
government legal advisors,90 and our data indicate that collective 
acceleration clauses appeared with some frequency in the bond issues of  
the 1920s and 1930s.91 On the whole, the evidence suggests that neither 
reformers nor market participants viewed collective acceleration clauses as 
an essential term. To all appearances, these clauses were merely one of  
many possible means of  addressing bondholder coordination problems, 
and not a particularly favored one. 
In the post-War period, collective acceleration clauses became more 
common, though they still appeared in only a minority of  bonds. As Table 
1 shows, these clauses were reasonably common long before Mexico’s 
2003 issuance brought CACs into the limelight. After Mexico’s issuance, 
however, collective acceleration provisions became widespread. Between 
1995 and 2002 — roughly the era in which collective action clauses 
became a subject of  debate — 27% of  the bonds in our sample included 
collective-acceleration provisions. After Mexico’s 2003 issuance, the rate of  
use of  these clauses jumps significantly. In the post-2002 data, these 
clauses appear in two-thirds of  the sample. Our data also reveal that these 
clauses became increasingly standardized. As a rough measure, we see at 
least eight different versions of  the clause in use in the pre-World War II 
period. After 2002, bonds with collective acceleration clauses cohere 
around a standard requiring a 25% vote to accelerate.  
 
TABLE 1. 
 
YEARS BONDS 
WITH COLLECTIVE 
ACCELERATION 
PCT. OF 
TOTAL 
1820-1944 460 23 5% 
1945-1954 34 0 0% 
1955-1964 79 15 19% 
1965-1974 59 4 7% 
1975-1984 118 9 8% 
1985-1994 259 40 15% 
1995-2002 433 118 27% 
2003-2011 591 374 63% 
 
The reform debates of  the 1990s did not introduce collective 
acceleration clauses to the sovereign debt markets. Nor was Mexico’s 2003 
issuance the first instance, although it did lead to their more widespread 
                                                          
90. Id. at 5–6. 
91. In our sample, 5% of  pre-World War II bonds include these clauses, and most of  these issues 
were concentrated in the first decades of  the twentieth century. 
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and uniform use. The long pedigree of  these clauses undercuts the claim 
that market participants were unaware of  bondholder collective-action 
problems and required instruction on how to draft clauses to tackle them. 
At the same time, the infrequent use of  these clauses suggests that market 
participants did not view collective-acceleration rights as necessary (or 
helpful) in enabling bondholders to mount a coordinated response to 
default.  
2. Modification Clauses and Their Substitutes 
Modification clauses enable bondholders to approve a restructuring in a 
vote that binds even dissenting bondholders. It is clear that by the 1930s, if  
not earlier, reformers were aware that the ability to bind dissenters might 
come in handy. Recall that the League’s Committee for the Study of  
International Loan Contracts suggested that bonds designate a bondholder 
representative with the power to negotiate a settlement “binding on all 
bondholders” — with or without a bondholder vote.92 At the same time, 
however, market participants seemingly viewed the ability to bind 
dissenters as a minor detail. In this section, we first present evidence to 
support this claim. We also present evidence that undercuts some of  the 
copying stories that underlie the pro-CAC narrative. 
a. The (Marginal) History of  Modification Clauses  
Modification clauses, like collective acceleration clauses, have a long 
history in sovereign bonds.93 Until the 1980s, however, they made very rare 
appearances. The earliest example we have found is a 1922 Czech bond 
issue negotiated in consultation with the League of  Nations.94 This  
significant issuance of  bonds involved major underwriting banks acting in 
consultation with governments in creditor countries.95 The 1923 issuance 
of  these bonds provided that, at a meeting to consider “any proposal 
which may be made to them by the Czechoslovak Government . . . , the 
decision of  the holders of  the majority in nominal value of  Bonds present 
at such meeting, either in person or represented by proxy, shall be binding 
                                                          
92. Report on Loan Contracts, supra note 82, at 20, 32–34. 
93. W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Producing Change in Sovereign Lending Practices, in SOVEREIGN 
FINANCING AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE UNCTAD PRINCIPLES ON RESPONSIBLE 
SOVEREIGN LENDING AND BORROWING (Carlos Esposito et al. eds., forthcoming 2013). 
94. The League assisted in arranging reconstruction loans for a number of  countries and cities 
that would otherwise have been global capital markets. These included Austria, Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Greece, Hungary, and the city of  Danzig. For history on the League Loans, see Margaret Myers, The 
League Loans, 60 POL. SCI. Q. 492 (1945); Decorzant & Flores, supra note 81, at 14–16. The Czech 
loans were not among the League Loans, but the Czech government requested that any disputes with 
the banks be arbitrated by the League of  Nations. See id. at 20 n.20. 
95. Decorzant & Flores, supra note 81, at 14. 
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upon all Bondholders . . . .”96 The clause (reprinted in full in the 
Appendix) does not limit the range of  permissible topics at the meeting 
and plainly appears to allow a binding vote on even a restructuring 
proposal. 
The League’s Committee for the Study of  International Loan Contracts 
was fully aware of  the Czech modification provision. Indeed, the 
Committee not only discussed the clause but mentioned one other 
sovereign bond that allowed collective modification: a bond issued as part 
of  the Belgian Conversion Loan from 1936.97 In our data set of  460 pre-
World War II bonds, however, no other bonds allow for collective 
modification. Indeed, we do not even find this clause in subsequent Czech 
bond issues.98 If  there was a perception that bond documents should 
include a mechanism for binding dissenting creditors, it quickly waned.99 
And there are some reasons why that might be the case. For one, as is clear 
from the League of  Nations report on financial contracts, reformers 
researched and deliberated over the use of  modification clauses but 
decided to focus their attention on other contractual devices, such as 
trustees and bondholder representatives.100 It seems that market 
participants did too. In our data set, approximately 5% of  pre-World War 
II bonds included collective acceleration clauses, and nearly 24% (85/460) 
provided for a trustee to represent bondholder interests.101 In the run-up 
to Mexico’s 2003 bond issue, this was also true of  the debate over 
sovereign debt reform, which recognized that many contract terms could 
mitigate concerns over holdout creditors and help bondholders respond to 
                                                          
96. The Czechoslovak State, Listing Application, $14,000,000 Eight Per Cent. Bonds (Jan. 11, 
1923). 
97. We found references to the Belgian Conversion Loan of 1936 in materials related to the 
Report of the Committee for the Study of International Loan Contracts, which we found in the 
League of Nations archives at the Peace Palace in Geneva, Switzerland. The materials discuss English 
corporate drafting practices (which reportedly included CACs at the time) and also refer to both the 
Czech and Belgian loans as the only examples of sovereign bonds to allow collective modification. 
The relevant parts are in two sections captioned Legal Questions Concerning International Loans 
(Oct. 1937) and Meetings of Bondholders Under English Law (Oct. 1937).   
98. See, e.g., Czechoslovak Republic, Listing Application, Secured Gold Loan of  1925 (Nov. 18, 
1925). 
99. As Marc Flandreau has documented, London Stock Exchange (LSE) rules allowed a qualified 
majority of bondholders to override a dissenting minority when it came to the decision to allow a 
former defaulter to list securities on the Exchange. See Marc Flandreau, The London Stock Exchange 
and the Early Emergence of Sovereign Debt Collective Action Clauses in the 19th Century (1827–
1868) (Nov. 4, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). In that context, LSE rules 
effectively implemented a CAC-like regime even in the absence of relevant bond terms. Unlike the 
case with a modification clause, however, the underlying bond obligations remained unchanged 
(although the dissenters could do little to enforce the debt). 
100. See Report on Loan Contracts, supra note 82, at 17–21, 32–37. 
101. The trustee could not necessarily have committed bondholders to a restructuring, but it 
would have been empowered to represent bondholders in a wide range of  contexts. See id. at 17–29. 
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default collectively.102 Modification clauses featured more prominently in 
the modern debate, perhaps because modification clauses had become 
more widely used.103 Yet, modification clauses did not become the center 
of  attention until the early 2000s.  
During the interwar years, standing committees also played a much 
larger role in negotiating a settlement following default.104 The CFB played 
the dominant role in negotiating on behalf  of  British bondholders and, in 
the 1930s especially, the FBPC played a key role in negotiating on behalf  
of  U.S. bondholders.105 Their negotiated settlements did not bind 
dissenting bondholders — and thus, did not address the problem that 
modification clauses are designed to solve — but the committees’ 
recommendations in favor of  a settlement held great weight.106  
The belief  that effective debt adjustment requires the participation of  all 
bondholders seems to be a modern one. In the pre-War era, restructuring 
proposals were designed to encourage bondholder participation. The 
reason is obvious: the borrower could not materially reduce its payment 
obligations unless most bondholders agreed to reduce their claims. 
Typically, participating bondholders would exchange their bonds for new 
ones with reduced payment obligations or would tender their bonds to be 
stamped with a notice indicating they had assented to the restructuring 
offer. The disclosure documents accompanying the restructuring offer 
usually made clear that non-participating bondholders would not be 
paid.107 On some occasions, the issuer also promised not to give holdouts 
a better deal than it had given to participating bondholders.108 In most 
                                                          
102. See supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text. 
103. See infra Part II.B.2b. 
104. See Eichengreen & Portes, supra note 85, at 15; Eichengreen, supra note 58, at 162–65. 
105. For a discussion of the complex relationship between the State Department and the FBPC, 
see Adamson, supra note 85. 
106. See Eichengreen, supra note 58, at 163. 
107. See, e.g., Republic of  El Salvador, Listing Application, Certificates of  Deposit for Customs 
First Lien Eight Percent Bonds (Mar. 22, 1937) (noting under the heading “Undeposited Bonds” that 
non-participating bondholders would not be paid and that, although “there is no intent . . . to deprive 
[these] bondholders of  their rights,” most bondholders had elected to participate and the “first duty 
of  the Republic . . . has clearly been to the . . . bondholders who have cooperated”); Province of  
Buenos Aires, Argentine Republic, Loan Readjustment Plan of  1933, at ¶ 8 (Feb. 23, 1933) (“The 
Province does not propose to make any payments . . . with respect to . . . non-assenting bonds.”); 
Republic of  Panama, Listing Application, Thirty-Five Year 5% Bonds (Dec. 4, 1933) (noting that 
“[b]ondholders who do not assent to the Plan are not assured” of  receiving payments intended for 
participating bondholders). 
108. Republic of  Chile, Listing Application, Consolidated Municipal Loan (Aug. 22, 1939) (under 
the heading “Covenants,” describing Chilean law providing that, if  any outstanding bonds were to 
receive “conditions or treatment different” from that received by participating bondholders, all bonds 
would benefit from the better treatment); Republic of  El Salvador, Listing Application, Certificates 
of  Deposit for Customs First Lien Eight Percent Bonds (Mar. 22, 1937) (promising under the 
heading “Readjustment Agreement of  April 27, 1936” that “the Republic will not pay a higher rate 
of  interest or grant better terms . . . to holders of  bonds” not represented by the committee that had 
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cases, however, the issuing country did not condition its restructuring offer 
on the assent of  any particular number of  bondholders — a fact that the 
disclosure documents accompanying the restructuring proposal often 
made quite clear.109 Even when a committee was appointed to represent 
holders of  the restructured debt and was empowered to alter the terms of  
the restructuring, individual bondholders retained the right to opt out 
(reinstating their original claims) if  they did not like the committee’s 
decision.110 Instead of  the all-or-nothing restructuring proposal envisioned 
by proponents of  modification clauses, countries proposed restructuring 
terms to each bondholder. 
From a modern perspective, this state of  affairs seems unacceptable. In 
part, this perception reflects increased concern over the potential impact 
of  holdout litigation on a sovereign’s restructuring prospects. We return to 
that subject in the final section. For now, however, we simply emphasize 
that, as an historical matter, restructuring proposals made little effort to 
bind holdouts.111 Perhaps the most notable example of  this indifference 
                                                                                                                                      
negotiated the settlement); Republic of  El Salvador, Listing Application, External Sinking Fund 
Dollar Bonds (Jan. 28, 1947) (promising under the heading “Offer of  the Republic” that “[i]f  the 
Republic shall hereafter grant to holders of  any group of  external bonds covered by the Offer terms 
more favorable than those contained herein . . . it will extend ipso facto proportionately more favorable 
treatment to all the other holders of  bonds covered by this Offer”). 
109. See, e.g., Province of  Buenos Aires, Loan Readjustment Plan of  1933, at ¶ 8 (Feb. 23, 1933) 
(“This offer is not conditioned upon acceptance by any specified percentage of  bonds . . . and 
acceptance by any bondholder will make the Plan operative as to his assenting bond or bonds.”). For 
similar examples, see Republic of  Chile, Listing Application, External Sinking Fund Dollar Bonds of  
1948 (Dec. 8, 1948); Republic of  Colombia, Listing Application, 3% External Bonds (June 24, 1941); 
The Department of  Antioquia and Others, Listing Application, Sinking Fund Dollar Bonds (Dec. 7, 
1949); Republic of  El Salvador, Listing Application, External Sinking Fund Dollar Bonds (Jan. 28, 
1947); Republic of  Panama, Listing Application, Thirty-Five Year 5% Bonds (Dec. 4, 1933); Republic 
of  Uruguay, Listing Application, Readjustment Exchange Offer (Sept. 15, 1937); State of  Hamburg, 
Listing Application, 4.5% Dollar Bonds (Mar. 19, 1956). There are some exceptions. For example, a 
1941 exchange offer by Panama became effective when accepted by more than 75% of  bondholders 
(although 100% acceptance was apparently required before the exchange bonds would be issued). See 
Republic of  Panama, Listing Application, at 7 (May 16, 1941). In 1923, a proposed Mexican 
restructuring allowed a committee representing bondholders to declare the plan “operative as to any 
issue of  Bonds at any time at which the Committee in its opinion shall deem a sufficient number of  
Bonds of  such issue to have been deposited . . . .” United States of  Mexico, Listing Application, 
(Readjustment of  Debt) Deposit Receipts (Aug. 1, 1923). 
110. See, e.g., United States of  Mexico, Listing Application (Readjustment of  Debt) Deposit 
Receipts (Aug. 1, 1923); Republic of  El Salvador, Listing Application, Certificates of  Deposit for 
Customs First Lien 8% Bonds (Apr. 30, 1932).  
111. As another example, some restructuring proposals appointed a committee to represent 
participating bondholders and gave the committee broad powers, including the power to modify the 
restructuring plan in ways that materially affected bondholders. This was consistent with the 
recommendations of  the League of  Nations Committee for the Study of  International Loan 
Contracts, which had noted the potential benefits of  bondholder representatives. The examples we 
uncovered, however, allowed individual bondholders to withdraw from the restructuring plan if  they 
did not like the committee’s decision. See, e.g., United States of  Mexico, Listing Application, 
(Readjustment of  Debt) Deposit Receipts (Aug. 1, 1923); Republic of  El Salvador, Listing 
Application, Certificates of  Deposit for Customs First Lien 8% Bonds (Apr. 30, 1932); United States 
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involves the 1922 Czech bonds, which contained the very first 
modification clause. 
Given the economic and political upheaval of  the ensuing decades, 
these bonds not surprisingly went into default. After World War II, the 
Czech government entered wide-ranging restructuring negotiations, 
including with the CFB and the FBPC. The FBPC archives at Stanford 
University include drafts of  the restructuring agreements and related 
correspondence. Notwithstanding the modification clause in the 
underlying bonds — which, recall, allowed bondholders holding a majority 
in nominal value of  the debt, voting at a meeting or by proxy, to approve 
“any proposal which may be made to them by the Czechoslovak 
Government” in a vote “binding upon all Bondholders” — we found no 
indication in the archives that any of  the negotiating parties ever 
considered calling such a meeting or otherwise attempting to bind 
dissenters to a proposed restructuring. Every draft of  the restructuring 
proposal envisioned that individual bondholders could assent to the plan 
by tendering their bonds to be stamped with notice of  the restructuring.112 
Of  course, the fact that holdouts were not viewed as a serious concern 
for much of  the twentieth century does not mean they have not become 
problematic in the modern world, where sovereigns no longer enjoy 
absolute immunity from suit.113 It bears repeating, however, that 
modification clauses are but one way of  addressing these concerns. Even 
if  we assume that holdouts can sometimes present a material barrier to 
sovereign restructurings, it is not clear why modern reform efforts assign 
such priority to modification clauses. As we have explained, pro-CAC 
narratives typically justify reforms by positing that market participants have 
simply failed to understand the value of  these clauses. But when we shift 
our gaze to the post-World War II era, it appears instead that market 
participants have been selectively employing modification clauses for some 
time.  
b. The Case of  the (Not-so) Mistaken CACs in New York 
In the 1990s and early 2000s, sovereign debt contracting practices raised 
two problems for proponents of  CACs. First, most English-law bonds 
already had modification clauses.114 Second, although most New York-law 
bonds required unanimity, a handful of  these bonds issued during the 
                                                                                                                                      
of  Mexico, Listing Application, (Readjustment of  Debt) Deposit Receipts (Aug. 1, 1923). 
112. See, e.g., Terms for Resumption of  Service Proposed by Czechoslovak Gov’t, Czechoslovak 
State Loan of  1922 (First Series and Series B) (1946). 
113. For a discussion of the rise of holdout litigation in general, see Julian Schumacher, 
Christoph Trebesch & Henrik Enderlein, Sovereign Defaults in Court: The Rise of Creditor Litigation 1976–
2010 (Apr. 15, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2189997. 
114. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 12. 
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1980s and 1990s included modification clauses. Recall that reform 
proposals were focused on the New York market. The ubiquity of  
modification clauses in the English-law market, and their occasional 
appearance in New York, suggested that the choice of  unanimity was a 
deliberate one.115 For example, perhaps the New York-law market catered 
primarily to investors who preferred bonds that were harder to 
restructure.116 After all, issuers in the New York market tended to carry 
below-investment-grade ratings, whereas those in the English market 
tended to be above-investment grade.117 If  many market participants did 
not like modification clauses, then arguments in favor of  CACs — 
including arguments made by one of  us118 — were much harder to justify.  
The copying stories we described earlier allowed reformers to dismiss 
the possibility that market participants were informed about CACs but 
sometimes preferred unanimity. The prevalence of  modification clauses in 
English-law bonds was mere happenstance, an accidental byproduct of  
English corporate-bond contracts.119 Some also attributed the occasional 
use of  modification clauses in New York-law bonds to copying. These 
bonds had been discovered by two researchers at the Reserve Bank of  
Australia, Mark Gugiatti and Anthony Richards. The issuers — 
Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Bulgaria, Egypt, and Qatar — were relatively 
obscure and had been using modification clauses in their New York-law 
bonds since the late 1990s.120 In another case, the Thai government 
guaranteed a Thai power company’s bond, which included a modification 
clause.121  
Gugiatti and Richards concluded that modification clauses had been 
included in these bonds by accident. Their explanation posited that the 
lawyers who drafted these New York-law bonds inadvertently began with 
English-law forms.122 According to the story, the lawyers who drafted the 
bonds worked in the London offices of  New York firms, and they simply 
                                                          
115. In theory, the unanimity requirement could have served multiple functions. For example, 
some investors may have preferred bonds that made restructuring harder, and these buyers may have 
dominated the New York-law market. Weidemaier & Gulati, supra note 8. 
116. Id.  
117. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 12. 
118. Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 43. 
119. E.g., Quarles, supra note 30; OLIVARES-CAMINAL, supra note 24; Eichengreen, supra note 10, 
at 84. We discuss these stories at length in Weidemaier & Gulati, supra note 8. 
120. Mark Gugiatti & Anthony Richards, The Use of  Collective Action Clauses in New York Law Bonds 
of  Sovereign Issuers, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 815 (2004).  
121. See Yan Liu, Collective Action Clauses in International Sovereign Bonds (May 12, 2002) (draft paper 
presented at IMF Seminar on Current Developments in Monetary and Financial Law), available at 
http://www.ieo-imf.org/external/np/leg/sem/2002/cdmfl/eng/liu.pdf  (mentioning the Thai 
guaranteed bond). 
122. Gugiatti & Richards, supra note 120, at 826. See also NOURIEL ROUBINI & BRAD SETSER, 
BAIL OUTS OR BAIL-INS: RESPONDING TO FINANCIAL CRISES IN EMERGING ECONOMIES 311 n.1 
(2004) (repeating the inadvertent copying story from Gugiatti & Richards); Häseler, supra note 44. 
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began with the (wrong) forms that were familiar to them.123 Gugiatti and 
Richards raised the question “whether the lawyers involved were cognisant 
of  the innovative nature of  the legal terms being used.”124 Their answer, 
although delicately phrased, was no: “[O]ur assessment is that [with one 
exception] the inclusion of  CACs was not necessarily a deliberate decision 
and was perhaps even somewhat inadvertent.”125 For reformers, the story 
had clear implications, which Gugiatti and Richards spelled out: “[T]he 
marketplace has historically paid little or no attention to this particular 
aspect of  bond contracts . . . . [T]he inclusion of  CACs has simply not 
been an important decision variable for borrowers or investors.”126 
This conclusion is undermined by our broader inquiry into twentieth-
century contracting practices. We have already discussed the relatively 
frequent use of  trustees and the occasional use of  collective acceleration 
clauses in pre-War bonds. Given these patterns, we are skeptical of  the 
claim that market participants were unaware of  CACs — defined broadly 
to include terms other than modification clauses.127 Moreover, our inquiry 
into the so-called “inadvertent” New York-law CACs suggests to us that 
these clauses were the product of  deliberate choice. 
The Indonesian 1983 and 1986 Bonds.128 All of  the bonds uncovered by 
Gugiatti and Richards were issued in the late 1990s.129 We have uncovered 
modification clauses in at least two previous New York-law issuances (in 
addition to the Czech issuance, the New York tranche of  which would also 
have been governed by New York law). These bonds were issued by 
Indonesia in 1983 and 1986, and, as we discuss below, their use of  
modification clauses probably cannot be attributed to copying from 
English forms. 
We begin with a caveat. The sales documents for these bonds do not 
specify the vote required to change payment terms. Instead, they refer 
readers to the Fiscal Agency Agreement, which we have not located. 
                                                          
123. Gugiatti & Richards, supra note 120, at 823. 
124. Id. at 825–26. 
125. Id. at 826. 
126. Id. at 827. The Thai guaranteed bond was somewhat inconvenient for the story because it 
had been drafted by the Hong Kong office of  a New York firm. The explanation given here was that 
this bond was somehow sui generis because it involved a co-guarantee from the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development. One of  us heard this explanation in the context of  a prior project 
where, along with Anna Gelpern, we interviewed almost all of  the key participants in the CAC 
initiative in New York a decade ago. See Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 6. 
127. See also Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, Innovation After the Revolution: Sovereign Bond Contracts, 4 
CAP. MARKETS L.J. 85 (2009) (expressing skepticism regarding the inadvertence claims based on 
interviews with some of  the key players). 
128. Republic of  Indonesia, Prospectus, U.S. $250,000,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 1993 (Sept. 
22, 1983); Republic of  Indonesia, Prospectus, U.S. $300,000,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2001 (Jan. 
18, 1986). 
129. The earliest issue was in 1997. See Gugiatti & Richards, supra note 120, at 821 tbl.2. 
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Theoretically, the Fiscal Agency Agreement could set a voting threshold of  
100%, but we doubt that this is the case. For one thing, as a structural and 
linguistic matter, this would be an unusual way to disclose that the bond’s 
payment terms could not be modified. Moreover, when English-law bonds 
include modification clauses, the sales documents often refer to the 
underlying agency agreement for information about voting thresholds. By 
contrast, disclosure documents for New York-law bonds typically state the 
unanimity requirement directly or do not refer to the subject at all.  
The modification clauses found (we assume) in these Indonesian bonds 
cannot easily be attributed to inadvertence. The issues were managed out 
of  New York. The law firms involved were White & Case, for the issuer, 
and Sullivan & Cromwell, for the underwriters. The prospectus identifies 
Sullivan & Cromwell’s New York office as a participant in the bond 
issue.130 The prospectus references three White & Case offices, New York, 
London, and Hong Kong. In theory, the bond template could have 
originated from White & Case offices in London or Hong Kong. It is 
much more likely, however, that the form originated in Sullivan & 
Cromwell’s New York office. Typically, the underwriter’s counsel provides 
the basic contract template.131 This practice is especially likely to be true of  
these Indonesian bonds, because Sullivan & Cromwell has long been a 
major player in the sovereign market, whereas White & Case has been a 
relatively minor one.132 
If  we are correct that these Indonesian bonds include modification 
clauses and that the contract template originated from Sullivan & 
Cromwell’s New York office, then it is hard to attribute these clauses to 
inadvertent copying of  English-law forms. Lawyers at Sullivan & 
Cromwell knew how to draft New York-law bonds and had plenty of  
forms at their disposal.  
Lebanon in 1997. The first of  the New York-law bonds that Gugiatti and 
Richards identified was issued in 1997, by Lebanon.133 The U.S. lawyers 
involved in this issue were based in New York. (Recall that the inadvertent 
copying story posits that the lawyers worked at the London office of  a 
New York firm.134) Dewey Ballantine represented the underwriters, and 
Freshfields represented the issuer.135 Assuming standard practice, Dewey 
Ballantine would have controlled the deal template, both because it was 
counsel for the underwriters and because the issuance would be governed 
                                                          
130. Id. 
131. See MITU GULATI & ROBERT SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE TRANSACTION: 
BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN 29 (2013). 
132. See Michael Bradley et al., Lawyers: Gatekeepers of  the Sovereign Debt Market?, INT’L REV. L. & 
ECON. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2712. 
133. The Lebanese Republic, Offering Circular, U.S. $400,000,000 8.625% Bonds (Oct. 29, 1997).  
134. Gugiatti & Richards, supra note 120, at 823. 
135. Freshfields is based in London. 
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by New York law. The relevant Dewey Ballantine office was the New York 
office, not the London office.136 
Despite this evidence, let us assume that these New York-law Lebanese 
bonds originated with English-law forms. The evidence suggests that the 
lawyers involved were engaged in design, not copying. Shortly after this 
first issuance, Lebanon issued a second bond governed by New York law. 
Once again, Dewey Ballantine was counsel for the underwriters. This time, 
however, the lawyers involved worked at Dewey Ballantine’s London 
office.137 The lawyers had an English-law template near at hand, for 
Lebanon had issued English-law bonds only two years before, in 1995. 
Below, we reproduce the relevant modification language in Lebanon’s 1995 
English-law bonds and contrast that with the language in Lebanon’s 1997 
New York-law bonds. The emphasis is ours and reveals important 
differences. 
Lebanon, July 25, 1995; $300 million; 9.125% Bonds due 2000 (English Law).  
The Agency Agreement contains provisions for convening 
meetings of  the Bondholders to consider any matter affecting their 
interests, including the modification by Extraordinary Resolution 
of  these Conditions or the provisions of  the Agency Agreement. 
The quorum at any meeting for passing an Extraordinary Resolution will be 
one or more persons present holding or representing a clear majority 
in principal amount of  the bonds for the time being outstanding, or at 
any adjourned meeting one or more present whatever the principal amount of  
the Bonds held or represented by him or them, except that at any 
meeting the business of  which includes the modification of  certain of  these 
Conditions the necessary quorum for passing an Extraordinary 
Resolution will be one or more persons present holding or 
representing no less than two-thirds, or at any adjourned meeting not less 
than one-third, of  the principal amount of  the Bonds for the time 
being outstanding. An Extraordinary Resolution passed at any 
meeting of  the Bondholders will be binding on all Bondholders, 
whether or not they are present at the meeting, and on all 
Couponholders.138 
Lebanon, Oct. 29, 1997; $400 million; 8.625% Bonds due 2007 (New York Law).  
The Fiscal Agency Agreement contains provisions for convening 
meetings of  Bondholders to consider any matter affecting their 
                                                          
136. A critic might say that this particular Lebanon bond offer was sui generis because it was 
backed by an International Bank for Reconstruction and Development guarantee (the same story that 
was told with respect to the Thai guaranteed bond).  
137. The issuer’s counsel was once again Freshfields.  
138. The Lebanese Republic, Offering Circular, U.S. $300,000,000 9.125 per cent. Bonds, at 8 
(July 25, 1995) (under the heading “Meetings of  Bondholders and Modification”). 
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interests, including the modification of  these Conditions or the 
provisions of  the Fiscal Agency Agreement, provided that no 
modification of  the Conditions or the Fiscal Agency Agreement may be made 
without the consent or affirmative vote (by person or by proxy) of  persons 
holding or representing no less than 75% in aggregate principal amount of  
Bonds then represented at the relevant meeting of  Bondholders 
which would (i) change the due date for any amount payable by the 
Republic under the Bonds; (ii) reduce or cancel any portion of  the 
principal amount of  the Bonds or the amount of  interest or any 
other amount payable under the Bonds or modify the rate of  
interest on the Bonds; (iii) modify the currency of  payment under 
the Bonds; (iv) change the identity of  any Person obligated under 
the Bonds or the release, in whole or in part, of  any such Person; 
or (v) modify the provisions of  the Conditions or the Fiscal Agency 
Agreement relating to the quorum required at any meeting of  
Bondholders or the percentage of  Bondholders required to pass 
any resolution or otherwise modify the provisions summarized in 
this paragraph. A resolution duly passed in accordance with the 
provisions of  the Fiscal Agency Agreement at any meeting of  the 
Bondholders will be binding on all Bondholders whether or not 
they are present at the meeting and whether or not they vote in 
favor. 139 
It strikes us as difficult, by any stretch of  imagination, to attribute these 
differences to inadvertence rather than design. The 1995 clause resembles 
the standard English-law modification clause of  the period.140 It specifies 
diminishing quorum requirements where, at an adjourned meeting, a small 
minority of  bondholders could potentially modify the bond’s payment 
terms. By contrast, the New York-law bond issued in October 1997 
establishes a higher voting threshold in which modifications must be 
approved by holders of  75% of  the aggregate principal amount of  the 
debt. The elevated voting threshold makes sense, as many U.S. investors 
viewed English modification requirements as too easily satisfied.141 In a 
letter to one of  us, Lebanon’s lawyers explained that they had deliberately 
sought to create a “hybrid” clause that “anticipat[ed] the need to 
restructure sovereign debt” without leaving open the possibility that a 
minority of  bondholders could approve a restructuring (as in English-law 
bonds).142  
                                                          
139. The Lebanese Republic, Offering Circular, U.S. $400,000,000 8.625 per cent. Notes, at 11 
(Oct. 29, 1997) (under the heading “Meetings of  Bondholders; Modifications; Waiver”). 
140. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 12; Weidemaier & Gulati, supra note 8. 
141. See G-10 REPORT, supra note 43. 
142. Letter from Louise Roman Bernstein at Dewey & LeBoeuf  to Mitu Gulati (July 17, 2008) 
(on file with authors). 
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The Thai Guaranteed Bond of  1998. As noted, in 1998 the Kingdom of  
Thailand guaranteed a New York-law bond that contained a modification 
clause. The law firms involved included the Singapore and Thailand offices 
of  White & Case, the Hong Kong office of  Cleary Gottlieb, and the 
Thailand office of  Freshfields. Many practitioners in the official sector 
knew about this bond, and there was no obvious way to dismiss the bond 
as the product of  inadvertent copying. Nevertheless, the fact that the bond 
was co-guaranteed by the International Bank of  Reconstruction and 
Development implied that it might follow a different drafting template 
than bonds without official-sector guarantees.143  
Our data set, however, includes one other guaranteed bond with a 
modification clause, and this one is not accompanied by an official-sector 
co-guarantee. Also issued in 1998, this New York-law bond was 
guaranteed by the Czech Republic and issued by a domestic airline, Aero 
Vodochody.144 And once again, White & Case was one of  the law firms 
involved, representing the underwriters out of  its Prague office.145 We have 
no ready explanation for why modification clauses appeared in these (but 
only these) two guaranteed New York-law bonds, but the answer seems to 
involve experimentation by a particular law firm rather than the influence 
of  official-sector co-guarantors.146 
More generally, we see little evidence that these early New York-law 
modification clauses can be attributed to blind copying. The more 
plausible explanation seems to be that there were small issuers, operating 
at the margins and under the radar screen, for whom the standard New 
York-law template was unsatisfactory. And so they innovated. Whether 
other players in the New York market were capable of  doing the same 
thing — or whether they required official-sector “help” — is another 
question. 
                                                          
143. See Electricity Generating Authority of  Thailand, Offering Circular, $300 million 7% 
Guaranteed Bonds (Oct. 13, 1998); see also Gugiatti & Richards, supra note 120, at 820 (noting the 
Thai bond and the guarantee). 
144. See Aero Vodochody, Offering Circular, 7.5% Guaranteed Notes Due 2005 (Nov. 10, 1998).  
145. The issuer counsel was the Prague office of  the U.S. firm, Altheimer & Grey. 
146. We also found modification provisions in issuances by one sub-sovereign in 1999: a bond 
issued by the Italian city of Florence under New York law. See City of Florence, Offering Circular 
(Apr. 29, 1999); City of Florence, Pricing Supplement (Oct 19, 1999). The modification clause in this 
bond cannot plausibly be attributed to drafter error or copying. The Florentine Offering Circular 
explicitly specifies both a unanimity provision and a non-unanimity modification provision, and 
states that subsequent pricing supplements should be understood to use the non-unanimity provision 
unless a particular supplement explicitly adopts the unanimity provision. Id. Terms and Conditions at 
79–80 (§ 15(a) “Meetings requiring majority consent,” and § 15(b) “Meetings requiring unanimous 
consent”).       
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III. WHAT’S OLD IS NEW AGAIN 
CACs may be a fine idea in many contexts. Public-sector actors may 
even play a salutary role in convincing market participants of  the wisdom 
of  including these terms in their contracts. We close, however, with a few 
cautionary notes about ongoing reform initiatives in the Eurozone and 
about contract-reform initiatives more generally.  
A. Euro-CACs, 2013 
After 2012, all Eurozone government securities with a maturity of  more 
than one year will include standardized CACs — including modification 
clauses that allow a restructuring vote to be aggregated across multiple 
series of  bonds. The rationale for this initiative neatly parallels the reason 
for the CAC initiative in New York a decade earlier. The bailout of  Greece 
in 2010 resulted in intense political fallout, and CACs were invoked to 
ward off  increasingly vocal critics. As was the case in the 1990s and 2000s, 
CACs were touted as a mechanism for replacing official-sector bailouts 
with private-sector involvement.147  
One problem with the CAC initiative is that most Eurozone countries 
already use CACs in their foreign-law bonds. Reformers, however, point 
out that much of  the debt stock in the Eurozone consists of  local-law 
bonds, which (they assert) do not have CACs.148 Thus, when Greece 
restructured its local-law debt in March 2012, it did so by legislating the 
retroactive introduction of  CACs into its bonds.149 Many viewed this as an 
objectionable and arbitrary act, far inferior to the orderly and equitable 
process that could be structured ex ante through the use of  CACs.150 Once 
again, reform plans implicitly took the view that the market was failing to 
design optimal terms: if  CACs were such a good idea, but local-law bonds 
did not use them, there must be a problem with the drafting process. As 
with reforms in the New York-law market, a high-level committee was 
created to draft model clauses.151 Eurozone leaders also decided to 
mandate use of  the model clauses. That way, smaller issuers — such as 
countries like Slovenia — could adopt the clauses without fear that the 
market would interpret the use of  CACs as a sign of  higher risk of  default. 
Once again, however, our data complicate this picture. As noted, our 
data set consists primarily of  bonds governed by foreign law. Thus, we do 
                                                          
147. Eurogroup Press Release, supra note 1. 
148. See Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 52, at 377. 
149. See Zettelmeyer et al., supra note 53, at 7. 
150. See Joseph Cotterill, A Proper Debt Restructuring, FT ALPHAVILLE (Mar. 16, 2012, 18:50), 
http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2012/03/16/927231/a-proper-debt-restructuring/. 
151. See EFC Sub-Committee on EU Sovereign Debt Markets, Model Collective Action Clause 
2012, Common Terms of  Reference (Feb. 17, 2012), available at  
http://europa.eu/efc/sub_committee/pdf/cac_-_text_model_cac.pdf.  
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not have a large or plausibly representative sample of  local-law issues. 
Nevertheless, those bonds we do have suggest that CACs have been 
sporadically included in local-law debt for many years.152 In the 1990s, for 
example, several issues by the United Kingdom (1992 and 1996) included 
modification clauses of  the sort commonly found in English-law debt. In a 
few other cases, sovereigns guaranteed local-law bonds with modification 
clauses.153 Then, after the CAC initiative in New York, the United 
Kingdom and Germany each included modification clauses in local-law 
bonds in an effort to provide a model for smaller, less-influential issuers to 
follow.154 A number of  smaller issuers have also used the clauses in recent 
years. These include Slovenia and St. Kitts & Nevis, the latter of  which 
recently completed a restructuring of  local-law debt that turned out to 
include modification clauses.155 
We cannot make broad claims about the prevalence of  modification 
clauses in local-law bonds. We suspect that these clauses appear rarely. It is 
clear, however, that the clauses have been used, sometimes by small 
countries on the market periphery. If  market participants objected to the 
use of  CACs, or if  lawyers were reluctant to implement them, we would 
not expect clauses to appear in these places. Of  course, this begs the 
question: why do we not see more local-law issuers using CACs? We 
cannot answer this question, although it is possible that market 
participants have long (and correctly) viewed local-law bonds as relatively 
easy to restructure even without CACs. One way or the other, it is clear 
that local-law CACs are not a novel invention that had to be designed by a 
government-sponsored committee of  experts. As was the case in New 
York, they were right there all along.  
B. CACs as the Latest Fashion in Contract Reform 
It is hard to construct a coherent picture from a century of  contracting 
practices. Even one sovereign bond issuance is the product of  multiple 
individuals operating within different institutions having different goals 
and incentives. As a result, we do not pretend to offer a complete 
explanation of  the role CACs have served in the sovereign debt markets. 
We do, however, offer several observations about the prominence CACs 
have enjoyed in policy debates over the past several decades. And to be 
                                                          
152. Among sub-sovereign issuers, we have an example as early as 1963: the City of  Milan. 
153. These include a number of  bonds guaranteed by the United Kingdom, Portugal, South 
Africa, and France. The French version of  a CAC is a procedure known as masse.  
154. This move by a number of  the more prominent European issuers is described as part of  the 
discussion of  the 2003 CAC initiative in Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 6, at 1674. 
155. See Republic of  Slovenia, Offering Circular, 4.375% Notes Due 2021 (Jan. 17, 2011); Robin 
Wigglesworth, St. Kitts and Nevis Agree to Restructure Debts, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2012), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/924e7bea-70f6-11e1-a7f1-00144feab49a.html#axzz2AyVhaQoN. 
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clear, despite the range of  contract terms capable of  addressing collective-
action problems,156 the modern discussion of  CACs has narrowed to focus 
largely on modification clauses.  
First, the interest in reforming sovereign bond contracts is not new.157 
Perhaps the major difference between modern and earlier reform 
initiatives is that modification clauses are now in vogue. Prior reforms 
focused on trustees and other mechanisms for allowing bondholders to  
monitor the issuer during the loan and respond to default. Even at the 
time, however, it appears that contract drafters were engaged in a fair 
amount of  experimentation, from the rare use of  collective acceleration 
clauses to the more frequent use of  trustees (24% of  our pre-War sample). 
Still, these clauses never entered widespread use, perhaps because official-
sector actors never pushed hard to convince the market to adopt them. 
After all, the bond markets crashed during the Depression, and the task of  
reforming largely dormant markets may have seemed less urgent. Yet the 
long history of  contract experimentation also implies that bond markets 
have a greater capacity to innovate than reformers often attribute to them. 
With respect to modification clauses in particular, we find it hard to believe 
that market participants did not know about these clauses. To the contrary, 
our analysis of  early- and mid-twentieth century restructuring practices 
indicates that restructurings were not thought to depend on the ability to 
bind dissenters. 
Of  course, dissenters may now pose a greater threat. The obvious 
reason is the demise of  the doctrine of  absolute sovereign immunity and 
the rise of  the modern vulture fund.158 Now that sovereigns can be 
sued — indeed, now that holdouts have achieved some rather spectacular 
(if  perhaps temporary) victories159 — perhaps CACs have become more 
important for limiting holdout litigation.160 But if  so, this trend does not 
explain the focus on modification clauses over other contractual methods for 
addressing holdout concerns. Nor does it create a plausible link between 
CACs and the key official-sector justification for them, which is that CACs 
                                                          
156. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 70–73 (discussing collective acceleration clauses) and 
92–113 (discussing modification clauses). 
     157. See supra text accompanying notes 82–89. 
158. See Schumacher, Trebesch & Enderlein, supra note 113.  
159. For example, seizing an Argentinian naval vessel, Drew Benson, Bond Vigilantes’ Ghana 
Ambush Proves Default Hex Unbroken, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 4, 2012), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-04/bond-vigilantes-ghana-trap-shows-default-hex-
argentina-credit.html, and obtaining an injunction that may require Argentina to choose between 
paying holdouts or defaulting on its restructured debt, NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of  Argentina, 
699 F.3d 246, 250 (2d Cir. 2012). 
160. This assumes the clause is properly drafted. See Anna Gelpern, Sovereign Restructuring After 
NML v. Argentina: CACs Don’t Make Pari Passu Go Away, CREDIT SLIPS (May 3, 2012, 10:38 AM), 
http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2012/05/sovereign-restructuring-after-nml-v-argentina-cacs-
dont-make-pari-passu-go-away.html. 
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help prevent bailouts.161 This claim has some theoretical backing.162 But it is 
absurd to suggest that recent bailouts — of  Greece, say, or of  Mexico in 
1995 — had anything to do with the absence of  CACs from the relevant 
bonds.163 CACs have become a talisman, invoked seemingly to imply that 
such small tokens can ward off  the great problems associated with massive 
sovereign borrowing in interconnected global markets.164 
The pro-CAC historical narrative abets this practice by suggesting that 
contract reform — something that official-sector actors can at least 
achieve — is beyond the capacity of  market actors. To a degree, we share 
the belief  that bond contracts may not contain the optimal set of  terms.165 
But a more accurate historical narrative begins by acknowledging that the 
bond markets exhibit more innovation than is often acknowledged. 
Likewise, we have found no case where official-sector actors have 
introduced a novel contract term into a bond market. If  CACs are to be 
the centerpiece of  a reform agenda, they should be defended on 
functional grounds rather than on contestable historical ones. 
 
  
                                                          
161. TAYLOR, supra note 4; Quarles, supra note 30. 
162. See, e.g., Eichengreen, supra note 10, at 83–88. 
163. See Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 52, at 368–70. 
164. As noted earlier, CACs appear to be the solution du jour. For example, we have also seen 
proposals to add collective action clauses to bonds issued by U.S. municipalities. See Remarks of  
James E. Spiotto, supra note 20. 
165. See GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 131, at 177–78. 
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APPENDIX 1: 1923 CZECH BOND EXCERPT 
15. Should circumstances arise hereafter in which it may be necessary or 
expedient to obtain the sanction of the Bondholders to any exercise of 
their rights or their decision upon any proposal which may be made to 
them by The Czechoslovak Government, Messrs. Baring Brothers & Co., 
Limited, and Messrs. Kidder, Peabody & Co., shall be at liberty by 
publication in two London newspapers and two New York newspapers 
and two Amsterdam newspapers of an advertisement to convene a 
General Meeting of the Bondholders to be held in the City of London at a 
place and time and on a day to be prescribed in the advertisement, not 
being less than thirty days subsequently to the publication of the 
advertisement and the decision of the holders of the majority in nominal 
value of Bonds present at such meeting, either in person or represented by 
proxy, shall be binding upon all Bondholders, whether present at the 
meeting or not, but such majority must be comprised of not less than fifty 
per cent. of the Sterling Bonds and not less than fifty per cent. of the 
Dollar Bonds outstanding, and any meeting duly convened may appoint a 
Chairman and be adjourned from time to time by resolution of the 
majority of Bondholders present in person or by proxy. Messrs. Baring 
Brothers & Co., Limited, and Messrs. Kidder, Peabody & Co., and Messrs. 
Hope & Co., may make such regulations as they may think fit for the 
temporary deposit of Bonds, issue of voting certificates, lodgment and 
verification of proxies. 
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APPENDIX 2: DATASET 
Issuer N % Total Dates of Issue 
Argentina 84 4.1% 1884, 1887, 1888, 1905, 
1909, 1910, 1911, 1912, 
1914(3), 1915, 1924, 
1925(5), 1926(4), 1927(3), 
1935, 1937(2), 1939(2), 
1970(2), 1991, 1992, 
1993(6), 1994(9), 
1995(13), 1996(10), 1998, 
1999, 2000(6), 2001(2), 
2005, 2010 
Belgium 82 4.0% 1920(2), 1921, 1924, 
1925(2), 1926, 1937, 
1954(4), 1957, 1961, 1962, 
1983, 1985(3), 1986(4), 
1987, 1988, 1989(5), 
1990(5), 1991(6), 1992(2), 
1993(5), 1994(5), 1995(2), 
1996, 1997, 2001, 2002(2), 
2003, 2004, 2008(4), 
2009(7), 2010(8), 2011 
Mexico 74 3.6% 1895, 1899, 1903, 1908, 
1910, 1913(2), 1963(4), 
1966(2), 1972(4), 1973, 
1975, 1976, 1977, 1981(3), 
1982, 1988, 1990(10), 
1992, 1995(4), 1996(3), 
1997(3), 1998(2), 1999(7), 
2000(3), 2001(3), 2002, 
2003(2), 2004, 2005(2), 
2007, 2009, 2010(3), 2011 
Russia (including city & 
railroad bonds) 
74 3.6% 1822, 1859(2), 1866, 1867, 
1869(3), 1881, 1882, 1888, 
1889(4), 1890(4), 1891(2), 
1893(2), 1894(4), 1896, 
1899, 1900, 1901, 1902, 
1905, 1906(2), 1909(2), 
1910(5), 1911, 1912(4), 
1913(3), 1914(4), 1916(2), 
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Issuer N % Total Dates of Issue 
1996, 1997(3), 1998(6), 
2004(2), 2006(2), 2010(2), 
2011 
Finland 69 3.4% 1926(2), 1963, 1964, 1965, 
1967, 1976, 1977, 1978, 
1980, 1984(3), 1985(3), 
1986, 1987(4), 1988(2), 
1990(2), 1991(6), 
1992(13), 1993(1), 
1994(2), 1995(2), 1996(3), 
1997, 2002(2), 2004, 2007, 
2008, 2009, 2010(7), 
2011(2) 
Sweden 62 3.1% 1861, 1864, 1868, 1869, 
1872, 1876, 1919, 1924, 
1977(4), 1979(2), 1980(3), 
1981, 1984(2), 1985, 1992, 
1995(6), 1996(4), 1997(3), 
2002(3), 2003(5), 2004(6), 
2005(5), 2006(2), 2007, 
2009(5) 
Greece 59 2.9% 1889, 1914, 1984, 1985(2), 
1987(3), 1989(2), 1990, 
1991, 1992, 1993(4), 1994, 
1995, 1996(2), 1998(3), 
1999, 2000(2), 2002(2), 
2003(5), 2004(3), 2005(3), 
2006(4), 2007(2), 2008(8), 
2009(3), 2010(2) 
Italy 57 2.8% 1863, 1925(2), 1959(3), 
1994(3), 1996, 1997(2), 
2000(3), 2001(4), 2002, 
2003(6), 2004(7), 2005(5), 
2006(4), 2007(5), 2008(2), 
2009(3), 2010(5) 
Portugal 55 2.7% 1965(2), 1966, 1985, 1986, 
1987, 1988(3), 1993(3), 
1994(6), 1995(8)1996(2), 
1997(4), 1998(4), 1999(2), 
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Issuer N % Total Dates of Issue 
2000(2), 2002, 2004, 
2009(4), 2010(4), 2011(3) 
Brazil 54 2.7% 1883, 1905, 1922, 1927, 
1931(2), 1972(2), 1976(4), 
1977, 1978, 1980, 1995, 
1996(2), 1997, 1999, 
2000(2), 2003(2), 2004(4), 
2005(4), 2006(2), 2007(2), 
2008, 2009(4), 2010(8) 
United Kingdom 13 0.6% 1916(2), 1917(2), 1978(2), 
1986, 1992(2), 1996, 
2003(2), 2006 
France 12 0.6% 1915, 1917, 1919, 1920, 
1921, 1924(2), 1932(5) 
Indonesia 11 0.5% 1979, 1982, 1983, 1986, 
1996, 2004, 2005, 2008(4) 
Tunisie (Central Bank) 10 0.5% 1995, 1999, 2000, 2001, 
2002(3), 2003(2), 2005 
Germany 9 0.4% 1924(2), 1930(3), 1937, 
1939, 2005, 2009 
Israel 9 0.4% 1989, 1993, 2000, 2003, 
2004(2), 2005, 2006, 2007 
Oslo 9 0.4% 1958(2), 1960, 1962, 1963, 
1967(2), 1970, 1977 
Dominican Republic 8 0.4% 1922, 1924, 1926, 2001, 
2003, 2005, 2010 
Korea 8 0.4% 1998(2), 2003, 2004, 
2005(2), 2009(2), 2010(3) 
Latvia 8 0.4% 1929, 1999(2), 2001, 2004, 
2008, 2011, 2012 
Romania 8 0.4% 1922, 1929, 2000, 2001, 
2002, 2003, 2008, 2010 
Slovakia 8 0.4% 1999(2), 2003, 2004, 
2007(2), 2009(2) 
Trinidad &Tobago 8 0.4% 1984, 1992, 1993, 1994, 
1996, 1999, 2000, 2007 
Ukraine 8 0.4% 2001, 2002, 2003(2), 2004, 
2006, 2007(2) 
Barbados 7 0.3% 1990, 1994(2), 2000, 2001, 
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Issuer N % Total Dates of Issue 
2005, 2006 
Buenos Aires 7 0.3% 1924, 1927(2), 1928(2), 
2010, 2011 
Pakistan 7 0.3% 1994, 1997(2), 2004, 
2006(2), 2007 
Qatar 7 0.3% 1999, 2000, 2009(5) 
Bolivia 6 0.3% 1870, 1871, 1909, 1922(2), 
1924 
Bulgaria 6 0.3% 1928, 2001, 2002(4) 
Thailand 6 0.3% 1988, 1989, 1994, 1997, 
2004, 2006 
Belize 5 0.2% 2002(2), 2003, 2006, 2007 
Cuba 5 0.2% 1904, 1914, 1923, 1927, 
1937 
Egypt 5 0.2% 2001(2), 2007, 2010(2) 
Norway (State Railroad - 
Statsbaner) 
5 0.2% 1999, 2000, 2001, 2009, 
2010 
Tanganyika 5 0.2% 1931, 1932, 1950, 1953, 
1957 
England 4 0.2% 1900(2), 1901, 1902 
Guatemala  4 0.2% 1997, 2001, 2003, 2004 
India 4 0.2% 1931, 1932, 1933(2) 
Japan (Nippon T&T Public 
Corp) 
4 0.2% 
1963(2), 1977(2) 
Morocco 4 0.2% 1999, 2003, 2007, 2010 
Slovenia 4 0.2% 1999, 2000, 2001, 2007 
Australia (Sydney) 3 0.1% 1943, 1946, 1939 
Belarus 3 0.1% 2010(2), 2011 
Berlin 3 0.1% 1927, 1957(2) 
Ceylon 3 0.1% 1930(2), 1935 
Cuba (Banco Central) 3 0.1% 2008(3) 
Dubai 3 0.1% 2010(2), 2011 
Dutch East Indies 3 0.1% 1922(2), 1923 
Ecuador 3 0.1% 2000(2), 2005 
European Coal and Steel 
Community 
3 0.1% 
1962, 1975, 1977 
European Investment Bank 3 0.1% 1976(2), 1977 
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Kazakhstan 3 0.1% 1996, 1997, 2000 
Korea (Development Bank) 3 0.1% 2010(3) 
Northern Rhodesia 3 0.1% 1932, 1933, 1949 
Salvador 3 0.1% 1899, 1922, 1923 
Serbia 3 0.1% 1881, 2005(2) 
Seychelles 3 0.1% 2006, 2007, 2009 
Southern Rhodesia 3 0.1% 1933, 1948(2) 
Switzerland 3 0.1% 1919, 1923, 1924 
Abu Dhabi 2 0.1% 2007, 2009 
Albania 2 0.1% 1995, 2010 
Aruba 2 0.1% 2005, 2006 
Bahamas 2 0.1% 2003, 2008 
Bahrain 2 0.1% 2003, 2010 
Bosnia 2 0.1% 1997(2) 
Brazil (Sao Paulo) 2 0.1% 1925, 1926 
British Guiana 2 0.1% 1942, 1949 
Congo 2 0.1% 1993, 2008 
Cordoba (Argentina) 2 0.1% 1906, 1928 
Danzig 2 0.1% 1925 
Estonia 2 0.1% 1927, 2002 
European Economic 
Community 
2 0.1% 
1976, 1977 
Georgia 2 0.1% 2007, 2011 
Germany (Berlin) 2 0.1% 1942, 1925 
Germany/Prussia 2 0.1% 1937, 1940 
Grand Russian Railway Co. 2 0.1% 1857, 1861 
Grenada  2 0.1% 2002, 2005 
Hamburg 2 0.1% 1926, 1956 
Helsinki 2 0.1% 1965, 1992 
Honduras 2 0.1% 1870, 1913 
Hong Kong 2 0.1% 2004, 2004 
Iran (Central Bank) 2 0.1% 2002(2) 
Iraq 2 0.1% 1937, 2005 
Kenya 2 0.1% 1933, 1952 
Liberia 2 0.1% 1898, 1912 
Luxembourg 2 0.1% 2008, 2010 
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Issuer N % Total Dates of Issue 
Macedonia 2 0.1% 2005, 2009 
Manitoba 2 0.1% 1908, 1920 
Mauritius 2 0.1% 1932, 1995 
Milan 2 0.1% 1963(2) 
Moldova 2 0.1% 1996, 2002 
Montenegro 2 0.1% 2010, 2011 
Netherlands 2 0.1% 1922, 1947 
New South Wales 2 0.1% 1937(2) 
Roumania 2 0.1% 1923, 1937 
Senegal 2 0.1% 2009, 2011 
Siam 2 0.1% 1905, 1922 
Sierra Leone 2 0.1% 1937, 1938 
South Africa (Johannesburg) 2 0.1% 1937, 1938 
Sri Lanka 2 0.1% 1997, 2007 
Tokyo 2 0.1% 1912, 1965 
Trinidad 2 0.1% 1933, 1948 
Tucuman 2 0.1% 1888, 1899 
Uganda 2 0.1% 1932, 1933 
Akershus (Norway) 1 <0.1% 1928 
Amsterdam 1 <0.1% 1958 
Antioquia (Colombia) 1 <0.1% 1949 
Antwerp 1 <0.1% 1929 
Argentina (Buenos Aires 
Province) 
1 <0.1% 
1910 
Argentina (San Juan Province) 1 <0.1% 1909 
Australia (Hobart) 1 <0.1% 1933 
Australia (New South Wales) 1 <0.1% 1946 
BA Water Supply 1 <0.1% 1890 
Bavaria 1 <0.1% 1956 
Belgian Congo 1 <0.1% 1958 
Bergen 1 <0.1% 1964 
Bergen (Norway) 1 <0.1% 1924 
Berlin Electric 1 <0.1% 1930 
Botswana 1 <0.1% 2003 
Brazil (Rio Grande do Sul) 1 <0.1% 1927 
Brazil (Western of Minas 1 <0.1% 1893 
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Railroad Co.) 
Caldas (Colombia) 1 <0.1% 1949 
Canada (Alberta) 1 <0.1% 1932 
Canada (British Columbia) 1 <0.1% 1932 
Canada (Newfoundland) 1 <0.1% 1933 
Chilean consolidated 
municipal loan 
1 <0.1% 
1930 
China (Bank of China) 1 <0.1% 1985 
China (Banque Industrielle de 
Chine) 
1 <0.1% 
1913 
China (Bd of Posts and 
Communications) 
1 <0.1% 
1908 
China (Canton/Kowloon RR) 1 <0.1% 1907 
China (China Development 
Bank) 
1 <0.1% 
2004 
China (Chinese Imperial 
Railway) 
1 <0.1% 
1899 
China (Honan RR) 1 <0.1% 1905 
China (Shanghai/Nanking 
RR) 
1 <0.1% 
1907 
China (Tientsin/Chinkiang 
RR) 
1 <0.1% 
1899 
China (Tientsin/Pukow 
Railway) 
1 <0.1% 
1908 
China (Tientsin-Pukow RR) 1 <0.1% 1908 
Cologne 1 <0.1% 1957 
Colombia (Antioquia) 1 <0.1% 1925 
Colombia (Caldas) 1 <0.1% 1926 
Colombia (Cundinamarca) 1 <0.1% 1926 
Columbia (Cauca Valley) 1 <0.1% 1927 
Columbia (Tolima) 1 <0.1% 1928 
Copenhagen 1 <0.1% 1963 
Cordova (argentina) 1 <0.1% 1899 
Cundinamarca (Colombia) 1 <0.1% 1949 
Czech (Carlsbad) 1 <0.1% 1924 
Czech (Prague) 1 <0.1% 1922 
Danzig Port 1 <0.1% 1927 
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Denmark (Consolidated 
Municipalities) 
1 <0.1% 
1921 
Dominica 1 <0.1% 1963 
Dubai (Dubai Global Sukuk) 1 <0.1% 2004 
Fed. Malay States 1 <0.1% 1934 
Fiji 1 <0.1% 2011 
Finland (Municipalities) 1 <0.1% 1924 
France (Credit Foncier de 
France) 
1 <0.1% 
1959 
France (Electricite de France) 1 <0.1% 1977 
Gabon 1 <0.1% 2007 
Germany (Central Bank of 
Agriculture) 
1 <0.1% 
1925 
Germany (Saxon Pub. Works) 1 <0.1% 1925 
Ghana 1 <0.1% 2007 
Gold Coast 1 <0.1% 1931 
Haiti 1 <0.1% 1922 
Isle of Man 1 <0.1% 1933 
Ivory Coast 1 <0.1% 2010 
Japan (Export-Import Bank) 1 <0.1% 1996 
Japan (Industrial Bank) 1 <0.1% 1924 
Japan (Oriental Development 
Co.) 
1 <0.1% 
1923 
Japan (South Manchurian RY 
Ltd) 
1 <0.1% 
1908 
Johannesburg 1 <0.1% 1937 
Jordan 1 <0.1% 2010 
Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats 
& Slovenes 
1 <0.1% 
1922 
Lebanon (IBRD guarantee) 1 <0.1% 1997 
Louisiana 1 <0.1% 1914 
Malaya 1 <0.1% 1949 
Medellin (Colombia) 1 <0.1% 1949 
Mexico (Mexican National 
Packing Co.) 
1 <0.1% 
1907 
Micronesia 1 <0.1% 1993 
Mongolia (Dev. Bank) 1 <0.1% 2008 
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Montevideo (Uruguay) 1 <0.1% 1922 
Nairobi 1 <0.1% 1949 
New Zealand (Dunedin) 1 <0.1% 1933 
New Zealand (New 
Plymouth) 
1 <0.1% 
1933 
New Zealand (Wanganui) 1 <0.1% 1932 
Nicaragua 1 <0.1% 1895 
Nigeria 1 <0.1% 2011 
Northern Ireland 1 <0.1% 1939 
Nova Scotia 1 <0.1% 1971 
Nuremberg 1 <0.1% 1957 
Nyasaland 1 <0.1% 1932 
Oman 1 <0.1% 1997 
Oxaca (Mexico) 1 <0.1% 1910 
Palestine 1 <0.1% 1942 
Paraguay 1 <0.1% 1871 
Poyais 1 <0.1% 1823 
Province of Upper Austria 1 <0.1% 1928 
Queensland 1 <0.1% 1890 
Rhodesia 1 <0.1% 1958 
Rosario 1 <0.1% 1900 
Rotterdam (Netherlands) 1 <0.1% 1924 
Saarbruecken (Germany) 1 <0.1% 1927 
San Paulo 1 <0.1% 1909 
Santa Fe (Argentina) 1 <0.1% 1883 
Silesia 1 <0.1% 1928 
South Africa (Cape Town) 1 <0.1% 1937 
South Africa (Pretoria) 1 <0.1% 1938 
St. Christopher Nevis and 
Anguilla 
1 <0.1% 
1963 
St. Lucia 1 <0.1% 1949 
St. Vincent 1 <0.1% 1963 
Stockholm 1 <0.1% 1977 
Sudan 1 <0.1% 1921 
Trondhjem (Norway) 1 <0.1% 1924 
Turin (Italy) 1 <0.1% 2008 
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Turkey/Ottoman 1 <0.1% 1928 
Valle del Cauca (Colombia) 1 <0.1% 1949 
Vienna (Austria) 1 <0.1% 1927 
Vietnam 1 <0.1% 2005 
Warsaw 1 <0.1% 1928 
Westphalia 1 <0.1% 1926 
Yokohama 1 <0.1% 1909 
 
